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ABSTRACT
After a thorough analysis of joint ventures in the cable
industry, we have determined both the reasons that these joint
ventures were formed and the characteristics of successful joint
ventures. The results were then applied to an analysis of the joint
ventures in the videotex industry and we developed recommendations to
the management of these and future joint ventures that might improve
their chances of being successful.
This analysis was performed by completing a literature search of
venturing strategies, joint venture theory, the cable and videotex
industries, as well as the joint ventures in each of these industries.
Telephone and personal interviews were then conducted with key persons
involved in joint ventures in both industries. We combined this
information to piece together the motivations, contributions and
structure of nineteen cable joint ventures and seven videotex joint
ventures.
The thesis is divided into three sections. The first section
summarizes the findings of the literature review about joint ventures
and the alternatives to joint ventures. The second section focuses on
the cable industry. It reviews the history, structure and technology
of the industry, knowledge of which is necessary to understand the
motivations for joint venture formation. We describe the motivations,
contributions, structures and results of each of the programming and
franchising joint ventures. This section concludes with a detailed
analysis of joint venture motivations and critical success factors in
the cable industry. The final section repeats this structure of
analysis for the videotex industry. After a discussion of the
structure of the videotex industry, we present the motivations and
contributions of each of the partners in various joint ventures. The
conclusion recommends steps these joint ventures should follow to
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insure success.
We found that gaining complementary skills, speeding market
introduction of product, reducing uncertainty of project completion
and gaining market power are all important motivations for forming
joint ventures in the service industries that we studied. This
parallels the motivations that researchers have discovered in the
manufacturing industries. We also found four success factors for
joint ventures: complementary skills, complementary company cultures,
non-conflicting goals and clear agreement on management control. The
videotex joint ventures between the national system operators, such as
Videotex America and Viewdata Corporation of America, and local news-
paper companies best meet these criteria.
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IINTRODUCTION
1.1 PURPOSE
The videotex industry in the United States today is on the brink
of becoming a major business. After years of field trials and market
surveys the first videotex system with color graphics capability was
launched in Florida in the fall of 1983. At least two more services
will be launched regionally in 1984 with national rollouts occurring
in 1985 and 1986.
A distinguishing feature of the industry, noticeable to even
casual observers, is the high proportion of competitors that have
formed joint ventures. Since a joint venture is not a common
venturing strategy relative to some of the alternatives, a natural
question to ask is why it is so prevalent in this industry.
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Scholarly literature on joint ventures is concerned mainly with
manufacturing industries and it was not clear how applicable the
research was to a service industry such as the videotex industry. The
central purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to provide a better
understanding of why videotex firms enter joint ventures and to
determine the elements that are necessary to insure a successful
partnership. In the course of addressing these concerns the thesis
will also help to determine the extent to which the existing joint
venture literature applies to service industries.
The relevance of these issues is evidenced by the standing-room
only audience attending a seminar about joint ventures at the Videotex
'84 meeting in April. Well over half of the executives in attendance
indicated that their companies were involved in, or were considering
entering, joint ventures. Their main concerns focused on the central
issues of this thesis: What are the reasons that a firm should
consider a joint venture and what are the determinants of a successful
joint venture.
1.2 METHODS
Although the central motivation for this project is provided by
the videotex industry, our hypotheses were formed by researching the
joint venture activity in the cable industry. The reasons for this
are two-fold. First, the cable industry has been in existence for
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over thirty years and provides a rich body of data relative to the
videotex industry. Many joint ventures have had time to run their
course and in many instances the principal players have been willing
to candidly discuss even the ones that were not successful.
Secondly, the fact that there are many similarities between the
industries makes it possible to draw conclusions from the study of
joint venture formation in the cable industry that are applicable to
the videotex industry. The relevant similarities and dissimilarities
between the industries are discussed in the body of the thesis.
The information was collected in a variety of ways. The initial
research consisted of an extensive literature review of journals,
magazines and books. The majority of the information on the specific
joint ventures was acquired through telephone or personal interviews.
The interviews were supplemented, where necessary, with information
from printed sources.
Whenever possible, all the partners of a joint venture were
interviewed. Since this was not possible in every case, there are
instances where one partner has supplied the information concerning
the other partner in the venture. In the cases where the partnership
dissolved due to differences in opinion no one source has been
exclusively relied on.
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A final point concerning methodology is that the joint ventures
discussed here are not a random sample. We do however, feel strongly
that they are representative of the joint ventures now present in the
cable and videotex industries.
1.3 ORGANIZATION
The thesis is organized into three main sections which consider,
in turn, theory, the cable industry and the videotex industry.
Chapter 2 opens the theory section with a brief review of all the
venturing strategies available to a firm. This provides the reader
with an understanding of how a joint venture strategy compares to the
other choices available to a manager who is considering a new venture
strategy. Once joint venture strategy is placed in context, Chapter 3
explores joint venture literature in depth.
Using the previous two chapters as a foundation, the thesis moves
into the research sections. Chapter 4 provides a brief history and a
discussion of the overall structure of the cable industry. Chapters
5-7 then go on to present an analysis of the forces affecting the
structure of the cable industry. Chapter 5 concentrates on the cable
system operators while Chapter 6 is concerned with cable programmers.
Chapter 7 focuses on the effect that changing technology has had on
the entire industry.
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Chapter 8 details selected cable joint ventures. The
contributions and motivations of each partner are listed along with
the structure of each partnership. Each joint venture is evaluated
and the chapter concludes with a summary of the motivations that led
firms to form joint ventures and the elements that seem to be crucial
for success.
The final section investigates the videotex industry while
drawing parallels with the cable industry. Chapter 9 is an overview
of the videotex industry. Chapter 10 focuses on the competitive
forces affecting the industry, thus laying the groundwork for the
discussion of videotex joint ventures in Chapter 11.
Chapter 12 completes the thesis by framing a list of conditions
that should be met before entering a joint venture in the videotex
industry. We have concluded that out of all the elements that must be
considered four of the most crucial are the issues of control,
conflicting company cultures, similar goals and complementary skills.
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2VENTURING STRATEGIES
Roberts' suggests that when corporations find themselves squeezed
by the stockholder's desire for growth of revenue and earnings and the
saturation of their traditional product markets, they must seek to
introduce new products to existing or new markets. Companies can
develop and commercialize these new products either with internal
venture strategies or with strategic alliances.
Each venturing strategy will fit particular needs, abilities and
personnel at any one moment. The use of various venturing strategies
-- what Roberts 2 calls venture merging and melding -- allows a greater
diversity of financing mechanisms. A strategy that uses all of these
individual venturing techniques will increase the likelihood of
success in new product commercialization. In any case, a long-term
persistence of at least five to seven years is required before the
benefits of these strategies can be clear. Before reviewing the
literature about joint ventures, we will briefly examine these other
venturing strategies. The knowledge of these attributes is necessary
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in a study of joint ventures since a firm usually decides on a joint
venture only after deciding that the alternatives are less likely to
be successful. Also, in many cases, a firm's reasons for deciding
against the alternatives affect its expectations for the joint venture
results.
2.1 Internal Venture Strategy
Berg et al. 3 hypothesizes that diversified companies and
companies with a high capability for internal transfer of technology
have a greater ability to be successful at one of the four types of
internal venture strategies:
o R & D Strategy
O Independent Business Unit Strategy
O New Venture Division Strategy
O Venture Spinoff Strategy
2.1.1 R & D Strategy
Most corporations choose to support their products with a
research and development strategy. To implement this strategy, a
department is established with complete responsibility for both
process and product innovation. Ties between this department and
product management or marketing vary. Companies that are good at R &
D strategies, such as some consumer product companies, like Procter
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and Gamble, or pharmaceutical companies, like Eli Lilly and Merck,
have learned to build close relationships between product management
and the R & D departments. This strategy has its limitations since it
works best with different products for existing markets. Thus,
companies choose this strategy as a means of maintaining sales
revenues in a particular product market. If a company desires
radically different products for existing or new markets, it must use
one of the other internal or "external" venturing strategies.
2.1.2 Independent Business Unit Strategy
Given this name by the inventor, IBM, the Independent Business
Unit (IBU) strategy is used to develop products that fail to fit with
the "mainframe" of mind. IBM utilized this technique to develop and
commercialize the IBM Personal Computer. Such products are developed
differently than and separately from products developed by the typical
R & D mechanisms within a company. The business communities common
knowledge of IBM's successful implementation of this venturing
strategy will may make the IBU as common as the SBU in the near
future.
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2.1.3 New Venture Division Strategy
Fast4 defines a new venture division as:
"...an organizational unit whose primary functions are (1)
the investigation of potential new business opportunities,
(2) the development of business plans for new ventures and
(3) the management of the early commercialization of these
ventures."
These organizations were quite popular in the late 60's and early
70's. Commonly named examples are the new venture divisions of
Ralston Purina, 3M and DuPont. More recently, the new AT & T has
committed approximately $200 million a year to probably the largest
new venture division in history in an effort use the talents at Bell
Laboratories. These divisions usually are formed to coexist with R &
D strategies within a company. However, the literature suggests that
this strategy has had mixed, if not poor results. In developing these
strategies, companies must be careful to obtain strong, long-term
support from upper management levels, particularly when the new
venture division is started as a major new strategy component of the
company's overall corporate strategy. For example, if AT & T's
political situation changes, the survival of the new venture division
at its initial high level of investment will be difficult.
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2.1.4 Venture Spin-Off Strategy
Unlike the IBU internal venturing strategy, some companies
spin-off separate entities when a by-product of R & D does not fit the
mainstream of the company's product development. Spin-off strategy is
used to attract outside investment, to gain marketing and operating
experience in a new product market, and to keep internal entrepreneurs
from leaving the corporate umbrella. 5
2.2 Strategic Alliances
Strategic alliances involve agreements between two or more
companies with the purpose of developing and commercializing new
products. A thorough literature search, revealed the following seven
alternative strategic alliances for commercializing new products
listed in order of increasing closeness of the relationship6 ,7 ,8:
O Licensing Strategy
O Venture Capital Strategy
0 Venture Nurturing Strategy
O Contractual (Cooperative) Venture Strategy
O Joint Development Strategy
O Joint Venture Strategy
0 Merger and Acquisition Strategy
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2.2.1 Licensing Strategy
Among the seven inter-firm venturing mechanisms, a licensing
agreement requires the least contact with another company. Licensing
agreements require one party, usually a corporation to develop, market
and pay royalties to a second party. The only control exerted by the
second party on the first party are outlined in performance clauses in
the license agreement. This venturing method is quite common for
manufacturing and pharmaceutical companies. In fact, the largest
selling prescription drug in the U.S., TAGAMET, was licensed by
SmithKline Beckman from a foreign pharmaceutical company.
Hlavacek et al. 9 write that licensing is the best strategy when a
product is early in its development cycle. However, the founding
company loses all control over the rate of market exploitation after
licensing the product to another company. If the founding company
might be an important factor to getting the product to market, then
companies should seriously consider other venture strategies that keep
the founders more involved.
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2.2.2 Venture Capital Strategy
A company has a venture capital strategy when it does not get
involved in the management of the companies in which it invests.
Companies such as DuPont, Exxon, General Electric and Singer have all
tried this strategy, but rarely does it have a significant impact on
corporate growth.
2.2.3 Venture Nurturing Strategy
This strategy involves a capital investment in another company
accompanied with managerial assistance. Robertslo cites the Cabot
Corporation as an example of a company that tried this approach but
failed. More recent investments by IBM in Rolm, and by AT & T in
Olivetti might be construed as venture nurturing relationships. These
relationships look similar to joint ventures and have been mistakingly
called joint ventures, but no separate entity is established to
formalize the relationship. Many of the advantages of mergers and
acquisitions can be obtained with the use of venture nurturing without
their disadvantageous effects on flexibility. Also, this strategy
seems effective in testing out potential acquisition candidates and in
obtaining a "window" on new technologies. 1 1
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2.2.4 Contractual (Cooperative) Venture Strategy
This venture strategy involves a close developmental effort
between a buyer and supplier which usually involves an agreement.
This strategy varies from the joint venture strategy in two ways:
o No equity participation.
o No separate entity established.
Instead, the suppliers gain lead time on rival suppliers and it
becomes familiar with the buyer's needs while the cooperative effort
rids the product of bugs. The buyer gets the supplier's expertise in
the solution of a problem, and maintains a long-term flexibility over
other sources. 12 Many relationships developed between buyers and
suppliers are actually contractual ventures in which the supplier
makes an investment for equity in the buyer. For example, General
Instrument's recent investment in United Satellite Communications,
Inc. was accompanied with a contractual agreement between USCI and
GI, which gives GI exclusive rights to supply the direct broadcast
satellite earth station equipment to USCI customers.13 As with venture
nurturing arrangements, these contractual strategies with an equity
kicker are improperly called joint ventures. Since the venturing firm
can make a profit through product sale even if the investment goes
bankrupt, such venture capital investments have been quite popular.
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2.2.5 Joint Development Strategy
Joint development strategies involve one-shot associations for
projects that are more unstructured than contractual ventures. Berg
et al.14 gives the example of Rockwell subsidiary Atomic International
(AI) and its relationship with a public utility in 1972. In this
effort, AI completed R & D that applied engineering and production
expertise, gained while working on compact engine technology, to steam
generation of electricity. The relationship with a public utility
stimulated the commercialization of the product. Joint development
strategies are effective for various informal arrangements from
producer-customer relationships to large cooperative research
projects.
2.2.6 Joint Venture Strategies
For the purpose of this thesis, we have defined joint ventures as
a contractual arrangement between two or more parties that forms a
separate entity in which each party receives equity. These agreements
must be more than simply stock agreements. They must include a
business plan and a description of the tangible and intangible assets
that each partner will offer to the new entity.
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These arrangements require complicated negotiations to insure
that the strategy fits with both partners' strengths and weaknesses,
as well as their objectives. Berg et al. 15 suggests that this
strategy has two important functions: acquisition of technology and
vertical integration. Other advantages include reduced capital
expenditures, achievement of production scale economies, rapid
commercialization of new products, and increased expected returns
(sometimes improperly called reduced risk). However, executives are
more aware of the disadvantages of joint ventures, including disputes
over procedures, conflicting goals of partners, antitrust
possibilities and problems arising from splitting the joint venture
project from a firm's operations. Thus, the majority of executives
consider forming a joint venture as a last resort.16
According to theory, joint ventures should dominate the
alternative venturing strategies, especially when partners have
complementary strengths and weaknesses. In fact, the cable industry
may be one of the first industries to use joint ventures as the status
quo for developing new products.
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2.2.7 Merger and Acquisition Strategy
Merger and acquisition strategies involve the combination of the
assets of one company with the assets of another. This can come about
by an agreement by both parties to merge or by one company acquiring
the assets of another through either a friendly or a hostile takeover.
In the past, especially in the sixties when P/E ratios were high,
merger and acquisition strategies have been quite popular. Recently,
however, stockholders have not always been happy with management's
decisions to acquire a company.
The major problem with this strategy, like that of joint
ventures, is fit. The problems of a particular company are not easily
solved by the management of another. Unlike joint ventures, these
strategies usually result in a loss of important managers who can be
of importance in the acquired small company. Other advantages of the
small company, such as flexibility, entrepreneurial spirit and other
incentives to grow, are also lost upon acquisition. Thus, mergers or
acquisitions frequently fail to meet expectations and many companies
-that have amassed a conglomeration of unrelated businesses are
becoming candidates of leveraged buyout opportunities. For example,
Warner Communications, Inc. fought off Rupert Murdoch, who considered
the pieces of WCI more valuable than the sum of these pieces. 7
Alternatively,many companies are selling off unrelated businesses -
Time, Inc., IT & T and Gulf and Western have taken steps to reduce
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their unnecessary assets. We can learn from these companies that
mergers or acquisitions are appropriate only when the synergies
between the companies are clear. Even then, an alternative strategic
alliance might be more successful at tapping those synergies.
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3JOINT VENTURE THEORY
3.1 General Comments
Before 1972, few companies seemed interested in joint ventures.
An active new issues market probably caused this disinterest. Then in
1971, the capital gains tax was boosted from 25 to 35% by the Tax
Reform Act of 1969. This not only discouraged the new issues market,
but also created less interest in secondary markets, forcing
price/earnings ratios downward. With acquisition strategies looking
less attractive, a search for new mechanisms of corporate investment
began. Joint ventures attracted much renewed interest. In 1979, the
capital gains tax was again decreased, but instead of seeing a
decrease in the number of joint ventures, their number rapidly
increased. The biotechnology and communications industries have been
a focus of this joint venture activity. As will be discussed below,
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changes in the Justice Department's policies on antitrust violations
has been one major force driving the acceptance of joint venture
strategies.18 Also, as corporations become more familiar with joint
venture mechanisms, they become more interested in finding new
opportunities to use their skills in joint ventures.
3.2 Patterns Across Industries
Joint ventures seem to occur more often in industries
characterized by barriers to entry, rapid growth and relatively large
R & D expenditures. The cable and videotex industries fit this
description quite well. Joint ventures are less likely to occur in
industries where product differentiation and brand identification
create barriers to entry, such as the consumer product and ethical
pharmaceutical industries.
To show this Berg et al.19 has used a parameter called intensity,
which equals the number of joint venture participations in an industry
divided by the number of firms in that industry, and activity, which
equals the number of joint ventures. These parameters for several
industries are positively correlated with parameters which measure
entry barriers (industry concentration, average size of firm), R & D
investment (R & D intensity, average capital expenditure) and industry
growth.
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3.3 Example: Chemical Industry Joint Ventures
A significant body of literature has accumulated about the
abundance of joint ventures in the chemical industry. Much about
joint ventures can be learned from this rather well studied industry.
However, we caution that each industry has unique characteristics that
govern joint venture pattern and that the conclusions drawn from any
one of these industries may not be applicable across industries.
The major reasons firms in the chemical industry enter into joint
ventures is to acquire skills and know-how (intellectual property:
patents/technology) or to decrease the uncertainty of supplies. These
firms form joint ventures with two equal partners (50:50) more than
80% of the time. Typically these are joint ventures between two
companies. These alliances were usually dissolved through a buy-out
where one partner purchases the interest of the other partner. They
tend to be terminated only after a few years of operation. 2 0
Joint ventures with four or more partners seem to be most stable
and 3 partner joint ventures seem to be least stable. Also, 51:49
splits have been more stable than 50:50 splits. The average size of
the investment in these joint ventures ranged from $1 million to $100
million. Joint ventures started with more than an $11 million capital
commitment lasted the longest. 2 1
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3.4 Classification of Joint Ventures
Berg et al. 22 classifies joint ventures in four broad catagories
(examples of each given in Table 2):
O Construction and Land Development
0 R & D/Exploration
o Production/Mining (and Initial Processing)
o Marketing/Distribution
3.4.1 Construction and Land Development Joint Ventures
These joint ventures are formed mainly for financial and tax
reasons. Berg et al. 2 3 believes that technology transfer is usually a
minor aspect of construction and land development joint ventures.
3.4.2 R & D/Exploration Joint Ventures
Union Carbide best described the reasons for entering R & D joint
ventures: "...to get there sooner with less risk." Corporations also
form exploration joint ventures to decrease their risk by increasing
their investment diversification and by increasing the likelihood of
success. This technique has been called "risk pooling." This type of
joint venture commonly has three or more parents. 2 4
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3.4.3 Production/Mining (and Initial Processing) Joint Ventures
Production and mining joint ventures similarly may be due to risk
diversification. This diversification may be necessary when a project
has scale indivisibilities. Furthermore, these joint ventures bring
together a firm with the resources and a firm with the technology. 2 5
3.4.4 Marketing/Distribution Joint Ventures
These joint ventures seem the most interesting because they
involve much more than merely risk diversification. Motivation for
these joint ventures also involves a large component of technology
transfer. These joint ventures can be further subdivided into two
categories: large/large and small/large joint ventures.
Large/large joint ventures combine the strengths of two or more
major forces. For instance, chemical and manufacturing companies may
combine their expertise in a joint venture.
Small/large joint ventures combine the technologically advanced
small company with -the marketing force of the large company. These
are probably the most common of all joint ventures. Berg et al. 26
writes that about 57.9% of all joint ventures are small/large joint
ventures. This interest in large-small combinations reflects the fact
that a large percentage of all technological innovation comes from
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small companies.
3.5 Motivation for Forming a Joint Venture
When executives from various industries were asked to give the
reasons they decided to form joint ventures with other firms, Berg et
al. 2 7 recorded one of seven reasons:
O To use a patent held by a partner.
o To use the partner's technological expertise.
o To gain production scale economies.
O To gain market and distribution scale economies.
O To penetrate a market rapidly.
O To jointly specify performance characteristics.
O To circumvent financial constraints.
More generally, the literature points to four major reasons for joint
ventures: to reduce uncertainty, to increase innovation and market
power, to benefit from idiosyncracies in tax and corporate law, and to
increase financial flexibility.
3.5.1 Reduce Uncertainty.
The major reason firms participate in joint ventures seems to be
to reduce uncertainty. This is verified by the fact that
manager-controlled firms form more joint ventures than
stockholder-controlled firms. 28 They can reduce uncertainty in two
ways: increase diversification or decrease the uncertainty of project
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completion.
Joint ventures allow firms to diversify, i.e. to spread their
investments among more projects. Managers believe that
diversification reduces uncertainty and should increase the value of
the firm; however, this diversification results only in lower
unsystematic variation in their investment returns (out of
synchronization with market returns). Since portfolio managers can
more easily diversify this unsystematic portion of the return variance
by buying a variety of stocks, joint venture diversification should
actually have little effect on security price. Thus, although
diversification may be perceived as a reason for forming joint
ventures, it may not be an accurate assessment of the benefits of this
venturing strategy.
The questionaire of Berg et al. 29 revealed that joint ventures
also reduce the uncertainty of technological completion of a project.
This effect could also reduce the unsystematic portion of the variance
in the expected investment return. But in as much as joint ventures
increase the expectation of success, and therefore, increase the
expected investment returns, through the combination of two necessary
skills, they increase the value of the partner's securities. Thus,
joint ventures may be formed to increase the certainty of project
completion.
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3.5.2 Increased Market Power.
By increasing innovation and by combining forces with other
firms, joint ventures can increase the market power of the partners.
By increasing their market power, they can charge higher prices,
increase their profitability and become a market leader with less
concern for the competition. Bachman30 ,31 suggests that because
investment in technical knowledge is long-term, joint ventures may
reduce the barriers to innovation created by long-term risk.
If joint ventures increase the parent's market power, the
expected value of the investment return increases. Thus, an
improvement in market power would significantly increase the value of
the parent's securities.
Berg et al. 3 2 suggest that joint ventures are formed to increase
market power by showing that joint ventures seem to be prominent in
industries with high entry barriers, such as industries with
preexisting distribution channels, large capital requirements and
scale economies. However, joint ventures are not important when
barriers to entry are brand identity or product differentiation.
An increase in innovation can create the improvement in market
power. Consider that the first company to market a new product
usually has the highest market share. 3 3
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Berg et al. 3 4 give several arguments supporting the notion that
joint ventures should increase innovation. Their economic argument
says that joint ventures get the best of both the large and the small
parent: the high revenues of the large parent and the low development
costs of the small parent. The combination of these cash flow
attributes results in higher revenue than if either company were to
develop the product independently of the other. Thus, they conclude
that joint ventures should stimulate innovation.
Berg et al. 35 also discuss ten other arguments that suggest that
joint ventures increase innovation: 1. Joint ventures combine
overlapping or related technologies; 2. Joint ventures supply
necessary technical assistance to a firm entering a new market; 3.
Joint ventures make possible the sharing of business risks; 4. Joint
ventures enable more effective use of specialized and scarce
managerial talent; 5. Joint ventures ensure sales outlets or
supplies of raw materials for a new product; 6. Joint ventures
provide a means for achieving economies of scale; 7. Joint ventures
stimulate industry wide R & D; 8. Joint ventures avoid some
duplicative R & D; 9. Joint ventures provide a means of R & D scale
economies; 10. Joint ventures reduce fixed R & D costs. Although
some of these may not stimulate innovation, such as effects on scale
economies, they make it seem likely that joint ventures do increase
the innovative skills of the parents.
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3.5.3 Benefits from Idiosyncracies in Tax and Corporate Law.
Berg et al. 36 also list some reasons that joint ventures may be
formed to take advantage of loopholes in tax and corporate law. Use
of the joint venture as a method for off-book financing seems to be
widely accepted as a reason that corporations form joint ventures.
For example, a corporation can issue debt for the joint venture
without having the debt affect the parent's balance sheet. This seems
to be the reason 50:50 joint ventures are popular; 51:49 joint
ventures would require one partner to use consolidation accounting
methods with the joint venture, which would obviate the tax
advantages.
Since royalties from licensing agreements are taxed at the
corporate income tax rate, tax law favors joint ventures over
licensing. Joint ventures give the technical contributor depreciation
tax shields to offset the dividend tax rate. Furthermore, joint
ventures are taxed at the capital gains tax for realized returns.
Other advantages the law provides joint ventures include the
limited liability for the holders of the joint ventures equity and
transfer pricing advantages where profit is not taxable. In addition,
the Reagan Administration has recently introduced a bill in Congress
that may give antitrust immunity to corporations participating in R &
D joint ventures.
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3.5.4 Increased Financial Flexibility.
In actuality, joint ventures are a useful way of obtaining
external sources of financing for investment projects. Joint ventures
-allow banks and other institutional investors to invest in debt
secured by the joint venture's cash flows and assets. The alternative
financing methods have numerous limitations. Besides having higher
transactions costs, the amount of financing may be limited by the
current equity and debt holders. Also, the cash flows from
alternative financing methods are quite complicated to estimate and,
subsequently, requires a high return. On the other hand, the cash
flows associated with senior debt from a joint venture are quite
clearly related to the specific investment objectives of the joint
venture. As a result, at some point in the financial structure of a
corporation, joint venture debt costs less than subordinated debt and
these corporations naturally choose the cheaper, joint venture
strategy.
Also consider the financing of the vertical-child joint venture
by a small and a large parent. Here, the large parent is a buyer of
the products supplied by the joint venture child. This large parent
is more than willing to finance a project for a product that it needs,
while the small parent gets the best financing terms available for a
planned project. The creative financing provided by a joint venture
strategy increases the availability of capital.
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3.6 Antitrust Issues
A large part of the literature about joint ventures deals with
whether joint ventures are anticompetitive. Up until the last
administration, antitrust has been a major deterant to the formation
of joint ventures. For instance, in an industry where joint ventures
are common, DuPont has consistently avoided forming joint ventures
because the Justice Department might react negatively. We raise five
major issues here:
o Vertical issues.
O Horizontal issues.
o Profitability issues.
o Innovation issues.
o Legislation issues.
Vertical joint ventures are anticompetitive when the joint venture
denies vital inputs to competitors when market foreclosure occurs to a
joint venture's competitors or when the joint venture is a major
supplier to upstream parents (also increases collusion; 3).
Furthermore, Fusfeld 3 7 clearly showed that complex linkages resulting
from joint ventures in the iron and steel industries could cause a
decrease in competition.
Joint ventures between parents that sell products to the same
markets, called horizontal joint ventures, may be anticompetitive.
Brodley 3 8 noted that the most broad application of antitrust law to
joint ventures occurs when the markets overlap. Pfeffer and Nowack 3 9
showed that industry concentration increases with the number of
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horizontal joint ventures. This suggests that joint ventures between
parents with overlapping markets is anticompetitive. However, a
slightly different measure of the number of horizontal joint ventures
showed that only a few joint ventures are actually formed between
companies with overlapping markets. 4 0
A correlation between an industry's high profitability and its
joint venture intensity would suggest that joint ventures were
anticompetitive. Berg et al. 4 1 showed that parent-parent horizontal
joint ventures do increase with the profitability of an industry, but
that non-horizontal joint ventures are associated with a low industry
profitability.
As mentioned earlier, joint ventures may actually increase
42innovation in an industry. For instance, Berg et al. showed that
high joint venture activity was associated with high R & D intensity.
As Berg et al. 4 3 have written, "Joint ventures may increase the number
of independent and viable centers of initiative in the economy." This
evidence suggests that although under some conditions joint ventures
have an anticompetitive effect, the large majority of joint ventures
may actually increase competition in an industry.
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3.7 The Evolution of a Joint Venture
The majority of literature about joint venture evolution is
written about the marketing and distribution joint venture between a
small and a large company.44 We will discuss this literature in
context with a discussion of how all joint ventures evolve. Joint
ventures commonly evolve through five phases:
o Initiation.
O Courtship.
o Negotiations.
O Success or failure.
O Dissolution.
3.7.1 Initiation.
In this phase, a company chooses a new product venture, examines
alternative new venturing strategies to commercialize the product, and
chooses a potential joint venture partner. Questions a large company
would ask concerning a potential joint venture with a small company
include:
o Is the new product venture appropriate considering
the company's strengths and weaknesses?
o Which is the most appropriate venturing strategy?
o Which small company is appropriate?
O Does the company need an interaction with this
small company?
O How could the company get what it needs from the
small company with minimum legal and financial
exposure?
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The small company must consider other issues including:
o Does the large company have a respected reputation?
o Does the company need the financial resources to
perfect and exploit a new product?
o Is the large company hungary for the new product?
Both partners should be asking:
O Does the large company have the appropriate
marketing channels and experience for the new
product?
O Does one company have strengths where the other has weaknesses?
3.7.2 Courtship.
Once the potential partners recognize a specialized opportunity
for cooperation, the companies should allow lengthy exploration of
technical and commercial issues. Participants must give full
disclosures. The companies must reach an agreement about what each
company's technology can or can not do. They must then agree on a
business plan and contingencies for possible dissolution. Finally,
the parents must disclose specific mutual expectations of respective
contributions and benefits. The more completely these issues are
worked out before sitting down to negotiations, the greater the
likelihood of a marraige.
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3.7.3 Negotiations.
In making an agreement, a precise definition of mission is
necessary. This includes stating the markets, geographic regions and
end-user groups. The specific responsibilities of each party must
also be delineated. Accounting procedures and distribution of profit
or losses must be planned in the agreement. Furthermore, performance
clauses are necessary if no separate corporation is formed. Periodic
performance reviews should be established in the agreement and a
policy machinery should be provided. Also, the agreement should
include provisions for dissolution of the joint venture. To insure
the success of these negotiations, the future joint venture management
team should be involved.
Several types of costs must be considered during negotiations.
For instance, participants should consider transaction costs, such as
legal costs and the costs of due diligence. Participants should use
different capital contributions to make adjustments for inequalities
in technical contribution. Participants should also consider the
costs associated with strategic presentation of information and loss
of control.
With respect to small and large company joint ventures, the small
company must realize that prodding a large company through the
negotiation phase will actually slow progress. The large company
usually begins to wonder why the small company is in such a hurry.
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The small company must gain leverage by bluffing the large company
that it may lose the investment opportunity to a competitor. The
small company should also follow up the joint venture negotiations by
immediately expanding their marketing plans as was outlined in the
agreement. To speed this marketing expansion, the small company
should initiate additional joint venture relationships. Frequent
meetings with top management of both companies will also improve the
chance of a successful joint venture.
3.7.4 Success or failure.
The literature suggests that several factors affect the success
of a joint venture. Bachman4 5 found that in the chemical industry,
three factors affected the joint venture success: complementary
technologies, economies of scale and risk reduction through the
combination of specialized know-how. Hlavacek et al.46 gives four
reasons that 50:50 small/large joint ventures fail: the small partner
fails to keep up its financial investment on an equal basis with the
large company; a partner realizes a poor fit; one company oversells
its contribution; and the technology and marketing skills of the two
companies do not match adequately. The literature clearly emphacizes
that joint ventures based solely on financial arrangements will be
unsuccessful. Adequate planning may be the number one prerequisite of
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lasting and successful joint venture relationships.
Another problem mentioned frequently is an "impedence mismatch"
problem.47 These problems arise from differences among the partners in
value or culture. These problems can be seen most prevalently in the
large/small joint venture, but probably affect other joint ventures as
well. For instance, while large companies see small companies as a
"fly-by-night," shoestring operations, the small company sees the
large company as sluggish in its decision making.
3.7.5 Dissolution.
Greater than a third of all joint ventures are terminate in less
than three years.4 These terminations are for one or more of six
reasons: 49,50
0 Antitrust proceedings initiated against the parents.
0 Depressed prices for the joint venture's product.
0 Technical obsolescence of the new product.
0 Liquidation of a coparent.
0 One partner with better use for its capital.
O Joint venture large enough to become independent.
0 Risk reduction no longer needed.
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3.8 Conclusion to Joint Venture Theory Chapter
This chapter has outlined the numerous issues that confront a
firm when it considers undertaking a joint venture. Seven points have
been considered:
o The types of industries most likely to have a high rate of
joint venture activity.
O The economical functions of joint ventures.
O The structural factors that lead to a stable joint venture.
o A general joint venture classification scheme.
O Motivations for forming joint ventures.
o Joint venture evolution.
O Elements crucial to joint venture success.
While all of these issues are relevant to joint venture formation,
this thesis concentrates on isolating motivations and the elements
that successful joint ventures have in common. We feel that these are
currently the areas of most concern to prospective joint ventuare
partners in the cable and videotex industries.
According to theory, firms are motivated to form joint ventures
in rapid growth industries with high barriers to entry including high
capital costs. The specific motivations that researchers have
uncovered are aquisition of skills, reduction of supplier power,
increased expected returns, risk diversification, scale economies,
attainment of capital and rapid market entry.
Likewise, researchers have found that the factors necessary for
success in joint ventures include presence of economies of scale,
complementary technologies and the reduction of risk through
specialized knowledge.
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The thesis now shifts from theory to practice in examining the
joint venture activity in the cable and videotex industries.
Throughout the remainder of the thesis we will be referring back to
this chapter to compare joint venture theory to what is actually
occurring in these industries.
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4CABLE INDUSTRY INTRODUCTION
After a brief examination of the history and structure of the
entire cable industry, the dominant forces in the industry will be
investigated. The information is presented using Porter's framework.
4.1 Origination of Cable Television
The cable industry got its start in the late 1940s and early
1950s when the country was being introduced to television. While
people in metropolitan areas were being entertained by talented
performers such as Milton Berle and Bob Hope many rural Americans were
denied this pleasure because of an inability to receive undistorted
televisison signals. The reason for the lack of reception was in many
instances not simply distance as many people believed, but the
impedance of the signals by uneven terrain.
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The earliest systems were built in mountainous areas located a
considerable distance from broadcast stations. For example, L.E.
Parsons, the owner of a local radio station, brought television
reception to the residents of Astoria, Oregon, located in a
mountainous area, 125 miles from Seattle. Parsons set up an antenna
on the roof of an eight story building and, by running wires from the
antenna to his set, was able to receive clear pictures produced by
signals emanating from Seattle's KRSC-TV.
Community acceptance was immediate and Parsons had his hands full
connecting television sets to his master antenna using coaxial cable.
According to Parsons, lines were strung from "house to house through a
city block.. .and Astoria has some pretty large blocks--we'd come to
the street, then we would set up a little radiating antenna with one
of our amplifiers feeding it and pick it up on the other side of the
street and continue for another block. We'd run all around town this
way. "51
Initially, Parsons did not have many of the problems and concerns
that have plagued the industry over the years. Franchising,
regulation and access to programming were not among the troubles that
immediately concerned him. For example, the television station whose
signal he was rebroadcasting saw Parsons' cable service not as
competition but as a way to increase their audience. As a result,
Parsons was given written permission to rebroadcast the signal of
KRSC-TV. Furthermore, there were no FCC regulations to comply with.
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In fact, Parsons' system touched off an internal FCC debate concerning
the commission's jurisdiction over the cable industry. This debate
went unresolved for almost fifteen years. Another advantage that
Parsons had over later cable operators was that at first he was
allowed by Astoria's town council to run cable virtually free of
restriction. Only later was he made to officially apply for a
franchise.
In the years immediately following the initial builds, cable
systems, many of them owned by multiple system operators (MSOs), began
to proliferate and with this proliferation came protests from
broadcasters, government regulation, franchise requirements and fees
and eventually a demand for more from a cable system than the ability
to transmit broadcast stations clearly. Each of these factors along
with more sophisticated technology helped to shape the development of
the cable industry.
4.2 Industry Structure
In his book, Competitive Strategy, Michael Porter argues that
"industry structure has a strong influence in determining the
competitive rules of the game as well as the strategies potentially
available to the firm." 5 2 There is no doubt that the structure of the
cable industry has played a central role in the abundance of joint
venture activity that is taking place--a strategy so prevalent that
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one analyst described it as "practically the hallmark of
capitalization structures among cable programmers." 5 3 As will be shown
later in the thesis, joint ventures are also common among cable
operators.
In its present state the industry as we define it, is composed of
two sets of players--each comprising a separate industry. (This study
does not include equipment suppliers since these firms are not very
active in cable joint ventures.) These two actors are the cable
system operators who install the cable and manage the system and the
cable programming service providers which supply the bulk of the
entertainment. There is a great deal of overlap since some companies
are vertically integrated, being involved with both operating systems
and programming, while some parent firms have separate subsidiaries,
each of which is involved in one facet of the industry. Both groups
of firms will be treated in this thesis since they are both heavily
involved in joint venture activity and to ignore one in a study of the
cable industry would be equivalent to doing research on baseball and
focusing only on the owners and the stadiums while ignoring the
players. The term, "cable television industry" as used in this thesis
will refer to both system operators and cable programmers.
In the following two chapters, the cable industry will be
analyzed using Porter's five basic competitive forces. This process
is done for both system operators and cable programmers since many of
the characteristics of the forces are not the same for the two.
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5CABLE SYSTEM OPERATORS
A belief that is commonly held within the industry is that it is
inefficient to have more than one cable system in the same geographic
region. Therefore, although cable operators are not explicitly given
exclusive contracts, the awarding of the franchise virtually
guarantees a local monopoly for the life of the franchise term. The
potential rewards have resulted in fierce competition among system
operators for franchises and sometimes shockingly high requirements
established by local franchising commissions.
The number of franchises still available however, is relatively
small since presently over 62% of the television homes in America are
passed by cable with this figure steadily increasing.54 As a
consequence, the number of basic cable subscribers has been on the
rise and, at the beginning of 1983, 30% of all television homes
subscribed to cable. Table 5.1 shows the amount of cable penetration
over the years. Table 5.2 lists the top 25 system operators ranked in
order of subscribers.
PAGE 48
* Best copy/text quality available.
TABLE 5.1 CABLE SUBSCRIBERS
Basic Cable Service: 1970-1983
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Dennis Liebowitz, a cable industry analyst predicts that within
several years 85% of the homes in the country will be passed by
cable.55 As a result, the bidding wars for new franchises are
dissipating and attention is focusing on developing the franchises
that have been granted. These are important facts to keep in mind as
the competitive forces affecting the industry are examined.
5.1 Barriers to Entry
5.1.1 Government Policy
Federal Regulation--The development.of cable systems has ebbed
and flowed in direct correlation with the regulatory tide. Initially,
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) virtually ignored the
industry, but this changed in the early 1960's when the FCC
promulgated a number of rules that severely curtailed the growth of
cable systems for a decade. The FCC began to relax its restrictions
in the early 1970's, and today the bulk of the restrictions that cable
operators face are imposed by local authorities when franchises are
awarded.
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For many years the FCC's regulatory policies were guided by the
desire to insure localized television service as opposed to
regionalized television where smaller communities were served by
television stations operated in larger metropolitan areas. The
Commission believed that "as many communities as possible should have
the opportunity of enjoying the advantages that derive from having
local outlets that will be responsive to local needs." 56 The FCC felt
that the importation of distant signals--defined as signals that most
viewers in an area would not be able to receive with an ordinary
antenna--by cable systems was a threat to the stated policy of
supporting local stations. The thinking was that viewers would tend
to favor the programming of the imported channels over the local
stations' programming. Local stations then would lose advertising
support and go out of business.
This philosophy led to the FCC ruling in the Carter Mountain case
of 1962 denying a Wyoming cable operator the right to transmit distant
signals via microwave. In 1963, the courts upheld this ruling,
opening the door for the FCC to establish rules and procedures
regulating system operators. In 1966, the FCC ruled that distant
signals could not be imported into the top 100 markets unless approved
at an FCC hearing. In 1968, this rule was strengthened and since the
main value of a cable system in most metropolitan areas was not
clearer reception but additional stations, cable system development
remained frozen between 1968 and 1972.57
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In 1972, new rules were agreed upon which allowed the carriage of
a limited number of distant signals into metropolitan areas and, as a
result, cable systems began to be built at a rapid rate. In 1980, the
FCC lifted the distant signal restrictions. This means that "only
three rules remain for the commission to administer. The first, the
sports blackout rule, prohibits a cable system from importing the
signal of a station broadcasting a local home game if the event is not
broadcast locally; the second rule protects broadcasters against
simultaneous cable importation of their network programming; and the
third rule requires all cable systems to carry the signals of local
stations. ,58
Local regulation--The standards that a cable operator must meet, along
with the services provided and the rates to be charged vary from
locality to locality. (There is, however, a rate ceiling imposed by
the FCC.) Over the years, as the competition for franchises increased
and local franchise authorities realized the value of a local cable
monopoly, the requirements increased in number and in cost.
Subsequently, some operators have promised more than they can deliver
and have had to renegotiate with local authorities to lower their
obligations after being granted a franchise. Warner Amex has recently
been in the news frequently because of this type of trouble with
several of its large urban franchises.
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Some of the key factors that local cable commissions consider
when awarding a franchise are:5 9
o The franchise fee an operator is willing to pay
O The reputation of the operator
O The financial and technical capabilities of the operator
o Whether local investors will be allowed to participate in the
venture
O Concessions to franchising authorities
O Services provided
The last two items include such considerations as providing
interactive services, providing certain programming for the basic
rate, set fees for each tier of service and the setting aside of a
certain number of public access channels.
Operators have gone to what many believe to be excesses to win
franchises. One example is in Boston where "among other oddities
Cablevision agreed to offer bonds to city residents so they can share
in the system's potential. Every Bostonian will be able to buy up to
25 $1000 bonds bearing a guaranteed rate of return of 16%.1"60
A bill sponsored by Senator Barry Goldwater is being considered
in the Senate which attempts to eliminate the haphazard establishment
of requirements. It proposes federal standards and administration of
both new franchise awards and refranchising agreements.
Copyright liability--For years a debate raged over whether cable
operators had to pay program producers copyright fees for the programs
shown on their systems. In 1976, legislation was passed requiring
cable operators to pay a certain percentage of their revenues to a
PAGE 54
Copyright Royalty Tribunal which then distributes them to the various
programmers. Payments totalled $25.5 million in 1981, which averages
out to about 1% of operators' non-pay revenues.6 1 Rules were recently
adopted requiring operators to pay up to 3.75% of gross revenues to
the tribunal.
5.1.2 Product Differentiation
Product differentiation plays an important role in two ways.
First, in order to win a franchise a system operator must convince the
local franchising commission that his operation is best suited to the
needs of the locality. Attempts are made to differentiate service
based on the criteria listed earlier in the local regulation section.
If an operator cannot prove that he is superior to his competition
concerning some, if not all, of these points then he has little hope
of winning franchises and the right to reap the benefits of a local
monopoly.
The second aspect of product differentiation concerns the selling
of the service to individual subscribers once the franchise has been
won and the cable laid. Despite having a local monopoly, the system
operator meeds to employ a trained sales force to make consumers aware
of the differences between cable services and other leisure-time
services, most notably broadcast television which viewers receive for
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"free." With the cost to install a system increasing, the percentage
of subscribers must remain high. Salesmen, going door to door,
practice selling techniques designed to differentiate their product in
the customers' eyes with the ultimate goal being, as one system
operator's sales manager put it, "to increase the customer's perceived
value of Cablevision." 6 2 This aspect has increased in importance
recently as the emphasis has turned toward increasing the number of
cable subscribers in existing franchises.
5.1.3 Economies of Scale
Porter defines economies of scale as "declines in unit costs of a
product (or operation or function that goes into producing a product)
as the absolute volume per period increases." 6 3 Economies of scale are
certainly evident in the operation of a cable system. The fixed costs
of installing and operating a system comprise a large percentage of a
system's cost when compared to the variable costs of hooking up and
servicing an additional customer. Therefore, the per unit cost of
providing cable service drops as the number of subscribers increases.
System operators such as American Television and Communication
(ATC) are attempting to take advantage of scale economies in areas
where they own smaller systems through a contiguous franchise
strategy. This involves the acquisition of separate franchises in
PAGE 56
neighboring localities so that the benefits accruing from economies of
scale in functions such as marketing, sales and installation can be
realized.
5.1.4 Capital Requirements
The cost per mile to construct a new cable system was estimated
to be $19,935 in 1982.64 Costs vary depending mainly on the franchise
requirements and the location of the franchise. In the cities where
at least some of the cable must be laid underground, costs can be as
high as $250,000 a mile versus $10,000 a mile in suburban and rural
areas where cable is strung on telephone poles. 6 5
For example, the Pittsburgh franchise cost Warner Amex $80
million to construct, and the Sacramento franchise weighed in at a
cost of approximately $200 million. 6 6 When ever-increasing marketing
costs are considered, it is easy to see that an operator of a large
metropolitan franchise must have large financial resources at his
disposal.
The large amount of capital required, in combination with the
existence of economies of scale have accounted for increasing
concentration in the industry. In 1969, the top eight companies
accounted for just over a quarter of all subscribers. In 1982, that
figure had risen to almost 43% as shown in Table 5.3.
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Table 5.3 Concentration of Ownership in Cable TV Industry.
(Subscribers to Top 8 Companies as percent of Total Subscribers)
YEAR PERCENT
1969 25.1
1970 27.4
1971 30.4
1972 35.4
1973 36.9
1974 36.9
1975 36.5
1976 34.6
1977 33.4
1978 33.8
1979 37.8
1980 38.8
1981 42.9
1982 42.8
Source: National Cable Television Association
5.1.5 Switching Costs
Once a system operator has obtained a franchise he has a definite
advantage over his competitors when it is time to renew the franchise.
This is due to the switching costs involved with having a new operator
install a new system. Although there would be no cost to the
franchising authorities in the financial sense, other, non-monetary
costs are associated with changing system operators that make it
infeasible to do so. In fact, "franchise renewal has been by far the
most common means of refranchising [since it] ... is not only simpler,
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faster and cheaper than comparative bidding but also is less fraught
with legal perils for a city."6 7
As far as the individual consumer is concerned, he usually has no
other cable service to switch to. If he wants to watch cable
programming he must subscribe to the local system.
5.2 Existing Rivalry
The intense rivalry exhibited between operators for franchises
has died down as the proportion of the country wired for cable has
increased. It was noted previously that over 85% of the country will
be passed by cable in the next several years. With few new franchises
still available, most operators are achieving revenue growth by
acquiring and/or trading for existing franchises and by taking
measures to increase revenues per subscriber and penetration rates in
existing systems.
Thus, the rivalry that was so evident in the franchise bidding
wars of past years is becoming less apparent as operators attempt to
maximize the revenues of the systems that they currently own.
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5.3 Substitutes
Thirty years ago, cable's main competition came from the
broadcasting industry. For a number of years, with the help of FCC
regulations constraining cable operators, the broadcasting industry
was able to keep the expansion of cable systems in check, but that is
no longer the case. Cable operators now face new competitive rivals
in the form of subscription television (STV), multipoint distribution
services (MDS), direct broadcasting systems (DBS), and satellite
master antenna television (SMATV).These competitors threaten to take
away current or potential cable subscribers by providing them with the
same programming or types of programming but using communication
technologies that circumvent the cable systems.
Some of these subscribers are in extremely rural areas where
cable is not likely to ever appear. However, in areas whe're cable has
recently become available, customers tend to stick with the type of
service that they initially purchased even though cable generally
offers more services at a lower price.
The competitive technologies also pose a potential threat as far
as programming costs are concerned. Prices for programming will be
driven up as the demand for it from competing technologies increases.
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5.4 Buyer Power
As has been mentioned earlier, the local franchising commission
has a large amount of bargaining power when bids are solicited for a
new franchise. This power is severely limited in refranchising
decisions by the high switching costs which are present.
Although the maximum fee that a cable operator can be charged is
5% of annual revenues, local franchising authorities still take
advantage of their favorable situation by extracting large concessions
from operators. Of course, this is becoming less of a problem as the
number of available franchises diminishes.
The individual subscriber has little bargaining power once the
franchise has been awarded. If he wants to receive cable television
reception then he will have to use the franchised operator.
5.5 Supplier Power
System operators deal with two principal groups of suppliers:
equipment suppliers and cable programming suppliers. Equipment
suppliers provide necessities such as coaxial cable, converters,
amplifiers. At the present time, with the number of new builds not as
high as in recent years, the demand for their product is not as great
as the supply so, as a result, they are not a threat to system
operators.
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Cable programmers also provide a service that is essential to
system operators since they provide the bulk of the product that the
cable system distributes. As a result, these services such as HBO and
Showtime/The Movie Channel have considerable leverage over system
operators.
System operators realize how crucial the control of programming
is and some have taken appropriate measures in order to protect
themselves. For example, Time, Inc., which owns ATC, the second
largest multiple system operator, also owns HBO, the largest supplier
of pay cable programming. Showtime/The Movie Channel, the second
largest pay cable programmer is jointly owned by three companies with
extensive cable system holdings.
The current attitude, however, is generally one of cooperation as
both system operators and programming services work together in an
attempt to increase pay and basic subscriptions. One example of this
is a promotional campaign initiated by Music Television (MTV). MTV is
providing system operators with free radio and newspaper ads
encouraging customers to subscribe to their cable system so that they
can receive MTV. MTV also provides operators with MTV T-shirts at
cost to be given away free to new subscribers.6 8
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5.6 Conclusion
The system operator portion of the cable industry is
characterized by its high barriers of entry in the form of large
capital requirements, scale economies and numerous--though
decreasing--government regulations. The environment is an extremely
competitive one during the bidding process and even when the franchise
is secured the system operator must deal with suppliers (cable
programmers) who are many times in a position of power. These factors
make system operators likely candidates to be joint venture partners
according to the theory developed in the previous chapter.
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6CABLE PROGRAMMING
This chapter examines the forces affecting cable programmers.
After a brief discussion of the various types of cable programming
channels, Porter's framework is again used to examine the structure of
this industry.
6.1 Types of Programming
Besides locally originated programming there are four main
categories of programming shown on cable systems:
1)Distant channels--These are usually normal broadcast channels that
originate far enough away so that the majority of homes in the viewing
area cannot receive them with a normal antenna. The cable operator
will receive them via microwave transmission and retransmit them over
cable as part of the basic service. Distant channels have become less
important as the number of pay channels and specialized programming
channels has increased. Also, operators have decreased the number of
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distant channels they have carried since the end of 1982 when
copyright payments went up significantly.
2)Superstations--these are normal broadcast stations that also send
their programming to cable operators via satellite. These stations
are offered as part of the basic service and operators are charged a
few cents per subscriber per month. Ted Turner's WTBS in Atlanta is
the most well known of these stations.
3)Pay cable programming--Pay television had been considered by the
industry in one form or another for years but it was not until
September, 1975, when Home Box Office (HBO) first transmitted its
programming via satellite that the concept turned the corner towards
profitability. HBO and its competitors offer a combination of movies
and special entertainment to viewers for a monthly fee averaging $10.
This is in addition to the fee paid for basic service. Cable
operators split the fee with the programming service.
4)Advertising-supported programming channels--These channels usually
cater to a targeted audience with specific programming. Examples are
ESPN--a virtually all-sports network and Lifetime which airs
programming targeted to women. Most of these channels charge cable
operators a few cents per subscriber and are offered free to the
viewer as part of the basic package. The majority are also advertiser
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supported with the service selling time to national advertisers.
Advertisers are slowly coming to the realization that cable ads are a
good buy. As more of these channels are given Nielsen ratings (a
minimum of 12.5 million subscribers is needed to get on the Nielsen
meter) advertising revenues should increase substantially. The
winning over of advertisers is crucial to the success of most of these
channels.
The operator earns revenues by selling two or three minutes of
local advertising time per hour. Some operators also earn additional
revenues by charging an extra fee for these channels instead of making
them available as part of the basic package. The operator is
sometimes prevented from following this strategy due to local
franchise agreements.
All of these programming services, with the exception of distant
channels, are usually available nationally and are beamed to cable
operators via satellite. Table 6.1 shows the increase in pay
subscribers in the last decade.
With this information in mind it is now appropriate to examine
the competitive forces at work in the programming side of the cable
industry.
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6.2 Barriers to Entry
6.2.1 Government Policy
As is the case with the cable operators, there is an atmosphere
of deregulation surrounding the cable programmers. Several years ago
the restrictions dictating the age of 'movies that could be shown on
cable were lifted putting the pay cable channels on an equal
competitive footing with the broadcast networks in terms of competing
for movie rights.
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Program regulation on a local level is concerned mostly with the
suitability of some of the offerings. Nudity is commonplace on some
of these channels which raises questions of censorship. The guiding
principle seems to be that since subscribers have a choice of what
they want to see, they do not have to pay for any channels whose
programming they find objectionable.
Cable programmers have had several encounters with the Justice
Department concerning Antitrust violations. In 1980, the Justice
Department disallowed a programming joint venture formed by four
studios and Getty Oil. This new venture, named Premiere, was formed
to compete with HBO. The films produced by the studios would be
supplied exclusively to Premiere for 9 months after their release.
The Justice Department ruled that this would severely hamper
competition in the industry. A similar argument was used to
discourage three studios from going into a joint venture with Warner
Amex Satellite Entertainment Corporation (WASEC) to run The Movie
Channel, an HBO competitor.
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6.2.2 Product Differentiation
Pay Cable--Much effort is expended by the cable services to make
both the system operators and the public aware of the uniqueness of
their particular service. HBO has a loyal customer base that must be
overcome in order for a competitor to be successful. The concepts of
multipay, where system operators offer more than one pay service to
subscribers; and packaging services together at a discount have
helped HBO's rivals overcome resistance. Still, many people balk at
paying an additional sum to purchase a service that they perceive to
be essentially the same as what they currently have. Mike Weinblatt,
the head of Showtime/The Movie Channel, stated in a recent interview
that his services needed to increase brand awareness in order to be
able to successfully compete with HBO.6 9
A campaign to differentiate a product in the face of a dominant
market leader is very expensive and time consuming. It is also
particularly risky since this type of venture has no salvage value if
entry fails. 7 0
Advertising-supported channels--Whereas the pay channels are
attempting to appeal to a broad cross-section of the American public,
advertising supported channels are trying to create brand awareness
and customer loyalty within certain segments of the population. The
channels strive to locate a segment large enough to attract
advertising interest and then to create brand awareness and consumer
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loyalty within that segment so it is protected from competition. This
is the same strategy used by radio stations and magazines. In fact,
one industry employee decribed these channels as being video magazines
due to their similarity in marketing strategy. 71
6.2.3 Economies of Scale
There is no doubt that economies of scale pose a crucial barrier
to cable operators. The programmers' costs are attributed primarily
to purchasing or producing entertainment and marketing their services.
Since most of the costs are fixed, a large subscriber base is
required to make a profit. HBO, with approximately 12.5 million
subscribers, has a profit margin of 20-25% but they are the exception.
Showtime, before its merger with The Movie Channel, had almost 5
million subscribers and was barely breaking even.
The advertising supported channels also need many subscribers
since their revenue per subscriber is lower. For example, The Weather
Channel was on the brink of closing operations at the end of 1983
despite being carried on systems with a total of 10 million
subscribers.
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6.2.4 Capital Requirements
The amount of money required to start a programming channel, be
it pay or advertising supported is not. trivial. John Lack, of WASEC
estimated over a year ago that starting a new pay service "would cost
hundreds of millions of dollars." 7 2 That is probably a low estimate
since programming costs have shot up in the recent months as the
demand for quality programming has exceeded the supply.
Examples of high programming fees abound in the recent history of
the industry. In December, 1983, Showtime/The Movie Channel made a
semi-exclusive agreement with Paramount to be the only pay cable
network to air the studio's films. Industry sources report the cost
of the arrangement to be in excess of $500 million.
This is the latest step in a bidding war that in 1983 saw HBO go
on a talent buying spree which "bid up the price of talent to a level
that (Showtime] could not afford." 7 3 During this spree HBO paid a
number of artists over $1 million in advance in order to secure the
rights to air their concerts.
Besides programming costs, initial capital is also needed for
transmission equipment, administrative and marketing expenses and this
large capital outlay does nothing to insure immediate success. Herb
Granath, president of ABC Video warns that "anybody getting into this
business will have to endure years of losses."74 . This means that the
operator of a cable channel not only has to provide a large amount of
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capital but must also be willing and able to wait for an extended
period of time to see a positive return on the investment.
6.2.5 Access to Distribution Channels
Another barrier which plays an important role in the industry is
a programmer's ability to have a system operator carry its
programming. The operator is constrained in the number of programming
services he can offer by the channel capacity of his system. Table
6.2 -shows the number of systems grouped by channel capacity.
TABLE 6.2 CHANNEL CAPACITY
Systems & Subscribers: By
cha.z1 Percent Cf
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A further constraint is that system operators must carry the
three networks and up to three independent stations as mandated by the
FCC. Also, local agreements stipulate a certain number of public
access channels. This means that an operator with a system capacity
of less than 21 channels--a group representing almost 30% of
subscribers--has to choose the programming services which he believes
will produce the most revenues. This is a tough sell for a new
programming service with an unproven product.
The situation is improving since many franchises are currently or
will soon be rebuilt with larger channel capacity. Most of the new
systems have a 36+ channel capacity.
6.2.6 Switching Costs
The good news for new pay cable competitors is that switching
costs to the subscriber are low. A phone call to the system operator
will result in a free service call to change services. In the newer
systems with addressable converters, the system operator can flick a
switch and "make the change from service to service in 60 seconds." 7 5
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6.3 Existing Rivalry
The competitive situation among programmers is best summed up by
Bill Daniels of Daniels and Associates which is one of the top 25 MSOs
in the country. He states that "with few exceptions, the place where
you make your dough in the cable business is being a cable operator.
Today HBO is making a tremendous amount of money but it took a big
risk.. .Software is so competitive. It's not that way as a local
operator. In very few instances do you have two cable systems in the
same area. We're not faced with the competitive problems of the
software programmers." 7 6
The competition, which was always fierce, has increased due to
the fact that, after years of rapid growth, during which entrants were
attracted despite formidable barriers, the industry slowed a bit in
1983. The increased competition took several forms. In pay cable, it
was highlighted by the bidding war mentioned earlier as programming
channels scurried to secure exclusive rights to product.
The competition among advertising channels varies from segment to
segment depending on segment size and the number of competitors
attempting to divide it up. One particularly vicious battle involved
Ted Turner, owner of Cable News Network (CNN). Faced with a new
competitor in the Satellite News Channel (SNC), Turner established
CNN2 which had a headline format similar to SNC. All three networks
responded by offering all-night news shows, so in the space of a few
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months, the customer was faced with not one but six services offering
continuous or extensive news. In addition, some local news shows
increased their length from one to two hours. The result was that
there simply were not enough subscribers or advertising dollars to go
around and the inevitable shakeout occurred. Two of the networks
dropped their shows and Turner bought out SNC for $25 million.
6.4 Substitutes
It is obvious from the news channel example that network
broadcasting channels are powerful substitutes in the competition for
viewers and advertising dollars.
The networks also serve as substitutes to pay cable channels in
the eyes of the firms who own the rights to the movies and sports
packages that both groups bid for. CBS and NBC have been negotiating
with several movie studios about getting theatrical films before they
go on pay television. The enmity that the networks feel for the pay
cable channels is exemplified by NBC Entertainment President Brandon
Tartikoff who recently stated that "at some point, the value in the
endeavor goes beyond the business deal. By doing this we'd be
weakening a competitor."7 7 If the broadcast networks can offer
well-known movies before pay cable, a key advantage of pay cable will
vanish. It could also mean a return of some of the advertising
dollars that have begun to trickle to cable.
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Broadcast television is the most obvious threat to cable
programmers at the present but it is by no means the only one. Movie
theaters, video cassette.s and a new service called Telefirst which
allows a subscriber with a VCR to tape a film transmitted over a VHF
channel overnight, are all substitutes for cable programming. Live
sporting and cultural events are also substitutes for the viewer's
time and attention as are other leisure activities.
The presence of such a large amount of substitutes makes it hard
for a programming service to attain the level of subscribers it needs
to show a profit. Realizing this, some programmers are investigating
other methods to transmit their product to customers. The following
section explains this further.
6.5 Buyer Power
The buying power of MSOs will slip if the cable system
substitutes mentioned in Chapter 5 gain in popularity. It is
conceivable that a cable programming service will sell its product to
operators of DBS and SMATV systems in the future in order to increase
revenues. If this happens then the MSOs' bargaining power will
diminish.
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The operators' bargaining power is currently handicapped by the
fact that cable programming is crucial to the success of their
franchises. Most metropolitan subscribers sign on because of the
programming that is offered with either the basic or pay services. If
these services are not offered then the single most important
attribute of a cable system for many people no longer exists.
The advent of multipay--the practice of offering the subscriber
more than one pay service--increased operator revenues, although it
reduced their power over pay cable programmers. The result is that
pay services are less often denied access to an operator's system.
The increasing number of systems with a large amount of channel
capacity means that operators can carry more services which bodes well
for many of the advertising supported channels. It also means that
operators have less room to squeeze programmers for favorable rates or
more ad time to sell.
This is not to say that the operators are totally at the mercy of
the programming services. Some of the larger MSOs have considerable
leverage given the number of subscribers they service. Some MSOs have
banded into groups to negotiate favorable rates with the pay cable
programmers. Another measure that system operators have taken to
strengthen their position is to secure their own sources of
programming as was mentioned earlier.
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6.6 Supplier Power
The major suppliers to the programming services are film studios,
independent producers, syndicators and owners of sports teams. These
suppliers hold a large amount of power over programmers for several
reasons:
O There are other industries besides the cable industry which
provide these suppliers with sizeable revenues.
O The suppliers' products are crucial to the programmers'
business.
o Some of the suppliers pose a credible-threat of forward
integration.
O The demand for the product eclipses the supply.
Programming services, especially pay cable programmers, have attempted
to alter this balance of power by forming alliances with the studios
which give them exclusive pay cable rights to some of the studios'
products. Many pay cable and advertising channels have their own
production studios to supply some of their programming needs.
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6.7 Conclusion
Until recently, cable programming has been a high growth industry
that attracted a large number of entrants. Now there have been a few
failures and, with the bloom off the rose, a potential entrant must
soberly consider how wise it is to invest in an industry characterized
by high scale economies in marketing and administration, rapid change
and the need for a sizeable amount of capital in order to launch a
service. A capital outlay of any size is a risky bet in this highly
competitive industry, (the competition comes from direct competitors
and readily available substitutes) that is still experiencing growing
pains. As is the case with system operators, these firms are
operating in an environment that is conducive to forming joint
ventures.
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7CABLE TECHNOLOGY
As mentioned in the last chapter, cable technology developed to
satisfy the demand of those individuals who could not receive
broadcast television signals because they lived in an area either
surrounded by irregular terrain or located a long distance from the
signal's origin. To complete the link between the program originators
and the television viewers, system operators like L. E. Parsons
installed high gain receiving antennas at points where an undistorted
broadcast signal could be received, amplified and relayed to the
community.
The changing technology of this link has played a central role in
the development of the cable industry. A cable analyst nicely summed
up the effect that technology has had when he stated that "necessity
is the mother of invention. With cable and its competitors,
technology is racing ahead of demand. Something new is happening all
the time." 7 8
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The cable industry is affected either directly or indirectly by
technology that changes the link between program originator and the
home user of video services. The cable industry is affected directly
when a new technology decreases the cost or increases the services of
cable signal transmission. Technological change indirectly affects
the cable industry when it improves the position of a competitor
industry by decreasing the costs of a different transmission
technology between program provider and the home user. Each of these
categories will be discussed in turn.
7.1 The Direct Effects of Technological Change
Technology affects the link directly by improving two types of signal
transmission technologies: from origination to cable system operator,
and from headend to subscriber.
7.1.1 Technological Change--From Origin to Cable System Operator
After the cable operators established the link that made them the
receivers, amplifiers and retransmitters of broadcast signals, two
important new technologies affected cable system operators: microwave
and satellite transmission technologies.
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In the late 1950s microwave technology allowed the transmission
of undistorted television broadcast signals from distances of several
hundred miles. The television signals were transmitted via microwave
to the system operator's headend (central receiving and distribution
site) where the microwave signal was separated from the broadcast
signal. Microwave carriage allowed broadcast signals to be seen,
distortion-free, in areas where they would not normally be received.
The result was added variety for cable subscribers. The resulting
improvement in cable service quality and the number of channels that
could be received by cable owners dramatically increased the demand
for cable. Up until microwave technologies were introduced, cable
markets remained only those geographical areas with poor reception.
These markets were usually small an'd as more stations were granted
licenses and began broadcasting, even the larger medium size city
markets began shrinking. With the introduction of microwave, a twelve
channel system became feasible and the large urban markets, with their
three broadcast channels became interested in cable.
Regulation in the mid 1960s that restricted cable distribution of
distant signals slowed the progress of this continual drive to make
cable more tempting to the urban markets. It was not until 1975 when
deregulation of the industry had begun that a breakthrough in signal
transmission occurred: Home Box Office (HBO), a first run movie
programming service, announced that it would beam its signals via
satellite to system operators nationwide who would pick up the signal
PAGE 82
using an earthstation. HBO until that time had been a regional pay
cable network transmitting its programming by microwave and videotape.
HBO's decision to use satellite technology to transmit programming had
ramifications both within, and outside of, the industry since it
dramatically reduced the costs of programming distribution. It
"altered the business plans of cable TV system operators, equipment
manufacturers, communications common-carriers, the performing arts,
sports promoters and private investors." 7 9
HBO's decision, in conjunction with the FCC's approval and
licensing of low-cost, small diameter earth stations, paved the way
for other services to emerge and today, of course, the market is
flooded with programming channels transmitting via satellite. Table
7.1 lists the various satellites along with the services using them.
Thus, satellite distribution of cable programming resulted in a more
varied cable service offering than was available to a cable
subscriber.
The introduction of satellites also created a new entry barrier
for programming services since the acquisition--through rent or
purchase--of satellite transponders became necessary in order to reach
subscribers. After the first transponders were utilized on SATCOM IV,
was established. A resulting problem was that cable operators had to
buy a second earth station directed towards the new satellite. This
created headaches for programming services such as The Entertainment
Channel which found itself on a poorly utilized satellite system.
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7.1.2 Technological Change--From Headend to Subscriber
The major improvement in this retransmission technology has been the
improvement in transmission quality, the ability to deliver new types
of two-way services and, as with the programming distribution
technologies, the increased capacity to provide a variety of
programming. Some of the earliest systems were wired with twin lead
wire which was very unsatisfactory. "The characteristics of this
cable changed with different kinds of weather.. .Another annoying
drawback.. .was that if the residents of the first house [in the
system] turned off their set at 9:00 P.M., the rest of the neighbors'
sets went off right down the twin-lead line--they were effectively
without television." 8 0 The use of coaxial cable solved these problems
to allow reception of a higher quality picture.
Coaxial cable had the added advantage of increased bandwidth
which allowed an increased variety of cable services. When the
franchises for many small U.S. communities were being developed,
coaxial cable with a 72 megahertz bandwidth was used. These systems
had a 12 channel capacity since each video channel requires
approximately 6 megahertz of bandwidth. 81 Today, over 50 channels can
be fit on cable with bandwidth exceeding 300 megahertz and system
operators are sometimes doubling that capacity by laying dual cable.
The system operators' ability to carry more channels complements the
growing number of services that are being offered.
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Technological changes in the transmission of signal from cable
operator to the subscriber have also stimulated the creation of
dynamic, interactive services in which the subscriber can participate.
Since 1972, most new builds have installed interactive (two-way)
cable. 82 Interactive cable provides the potential for a subscriber to
make transactions and have some control of the programming he
receives. Some systems actually allow the subscriber to participate
in the program. For example, Warner Amex Cable Communications' (WACC)
Qube service in their Columbus, Ohio system has had boxing viewers
vote for the the winning boxer in their estimation. The votes are
tabulated and shown on the screen. Besides allowing the viewer to
participate in programming, interactive cable opens up the possibility
of supplying transactional services like shopping and banking at home.
These services will be provided more frequently as the percentage of
systems with interactive capabilities grows larger.
Addressability has also surfaced as one of the key technological
issues in the recent history of the industry. Homes equipped with
addressable converters can be controlled individually from the system
operator's headend. This allows the operator to offer multiple tiers
of pay programming and two way services without making a service call
each time a subscriber changes his services. More importantly,
addressability allows a simple method to provide homes with one time,
pay-per-view events. Since pay-per-view is expected to increase
dramatically in the next decade cable operators are equipping with a
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technology which allows them to easily control the flow of programming
into individual homes.
According to Irving Kahn--the former president of TelePrompTer
who has been called "a visionary of the industry"--laser technology
will cause the next major change in the industry. Glass fiber cables
used by laser technology will allow bandwidths more that 20 times
larger than the widest bandwidth coaxial cable. Also, the cost of the
glass fiber will be much less costly than coaxial cable. Kahn listed
many other advantages to laser technology; however, fiber cables are
presently only being laid between headends. Apparently, the only
problem holding up a broader acceptance of laser technology is the
high cost of the equipment required to convert from laser back to
traditional signals for the television reception of the signal.
Considering that the cable industry has a multibillion dollar
investment in traditional transmission technologies, we suspect that
they will be sluggish in accepting laser technology. Only the
competition might stimulate a more rapid adoption of this novel
technology that would give the cable industry a clear advantage over
other links between program originators and the home video user.
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7.2 The Indirect Effects of Technological Change
While the technology important to the cable industry improved, other
technologies developed to make the link between the program originator
and the home video service user. The four major types of competitors
are subscription television (STV), microwave distribution systems
(MDS), direct broadcasting systems (DBS), and satellite master antenna
television (SMATV). Following is a description of technologies
involved in transmitting the signals for each system.
MDS--As cable operators began using microwave to transmit and receive
long-distance programming, competitors developed the technology to
transmit programming directly to television viewers. Programming is
transmitted in this system via line-of-site microwave signals. MDS is
a 5-8 channel system (as with other airwave communications methods,
the FCC determines the amount of bandwidth allocated to MDS) that
until recently was targeted at hotels and apartment buildings. Now
that smaller, less expensive antennas have been developed, it is also
being marketed to single family homes.
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MATV/SMATV--MATV and SMATV technologies developed as a result of
the buying power of large apartment buildings who originally obviated
the cable operator by having a master antenna which their tenants
could use to receive clear network broadcasting signals. An SMATV
system is simply an extension of this concept with an earth station of
the type cable operators use to receive programming from the same
satellites used to transmit to system operators. In essence, the
technology is the same as that used by the cable industry with
programming received by satellite and subscribers hooked into the
system by cable. The difference is that the cable distribution of the
programming is limited to one apartment complex. As a consequence,
SMATV is also known as private cable. Because the market for these
systems has been small, the cable industry competes with this
technology by building economies of scale and by offering special
interactive services that these small SMATV systems may not offer.
STV--With the development of addressable converters, broadcasting
companies have tried to develop STV technology to bypass the cable
operator. The STV technology that they developed scrambles the
broadcast signal upon transmission. This signal must then be
unscrambled with an addressable converter which is given to the
subscriber. The use of addressable converters allows STV to offer
pay-per-view programming as well as continuous programming where the
subscriber pays a monthly fee. As with most of the other cable
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substitutes, STV offers a limited number of channels (usually one to
three) and therefore has had little effect on the cable industry.
DBS--A more recent development allowed low cost reception of the
signals from satellites by earth stations owned or rented by
individuals instead of cable operators. This technology presently
only offers 3 to 6 channels of programming, but in the future,
technological improvements of this young technology are expected to
increase the number of channels to be competitive with cable
technologies.
This competition was not present years ago, since satellite
transmission used the mu band (4-6 MHz) which could only be received
by large earth stations costing a minimum of $2000. However, many
recently launched satellites have transponders that are substantially
more powerful, and they operate off a higher frequency, the ku band
(14-16 MHz). These two characteristics allow reception by earth
stations that cost $300 or less.83 Besides the drop in price,
individually owned earth stations are becoming more common due to the
FCC's deregulation of receive-only earth stations.
Although capital costs can be forbidding--for example, the first
DBS service (offered by USCI) has required more than a $200 million
investment over three years--dozens of companies have applied for DBS
licenses from the FCC. Of the technologies that threaten cable, DBS
may be the only one with a chance of having a major impact on the
PAGE 90
cable industry. In the future, the interactive service capabilities
of cable may be the only services available on cable but not available
on DBS; however, the other communications companies may make these
services available. This threat from DBS and the communications
companies may stimulate the cable industry's use of laser technology
in the near future.
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8CABLE JOINT VENTURES
The preceding chapters outlined the nature of the cable
television industry in order to provide the reader with a basic
understanding of the forces affecting the structure of the industry.
This chapter presents a detailed accounting of the joint ventures that
were studied. For each joint venture, the motivations, goals and
structure are listed. Each section concludes with an evaluation which
sums up how well the operation was running and offers reason for the
specific results. The chapter concludes with a summary of the
elements that all or most of these joint ventures share and compares
these findings with the theory developed in chapter 3.
As was stated in the Introduction, material on each of the joint
ventures was collected through phone and personal interviews as well
as through the literature. Where background information has been
provided by the person or persons listed in the acknowledgements no
further reference has been provided. However, in every other
instance, a source is cited in the usual way.
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CABLE JOINT VENTURES.
JOINT VENTURE PARENTS DESCRIPTION
Disney Channel
Satellite News Channel
ARTS and
Entertainment
Disney
Group W Satellite
ABC Video
Group W Satellite
Hearst
ABC Video
Rockefeller Center TV
Pay Channel
Ad Supported
News
Ad Supported
Cultural Programming
Hearst
ABC Video
Viacom
Ad Supported
Health and
Women's Topics
SportsChannel
Playboy Channel
Spotlight
Cablevision
Washington Post
Playboy
Cablevision
Cablevision
Storer
Cox
TCI
Times-Mirror
Pay Channel--Sports
Pay Channel
Adult Programming
Pay Channel
Showtime-The
Movie Channel
Tri Star
Warner Amex
Theta Cable
Manhattan CATV
Group W Cable
Franchises
Warner Amex Cable
Franchises
Warner Communications
Warner Amex
Viacom
HBO
Columbia Pictures
CBS
Warner Communications
American Express
Hughes Aircraft
TelePrompTer
Group W Cable
Local Investors
WACC
Local Investors
Pay Channel
Film Studio
MSO and
Programmer
Franchises
N.Y. and L.A.
Franchises
Franchises
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Lifetime
Table 8. 1
Table 8.1 CABLE JOINT VENTURES (continued).
JOINT VENTURE PARENTS
Continental Cable- Continental Cablevision
vision Franchises Local Investors (Chicago)
Competing System
Operator (Springfield)
Cablevision Cablevision
Franchises Scripps-Howard
DESCRIPTION
Franchises
Chicago
and Springfield
Franchises
Connecticut
and California
The joint ventures have been divided into two types: franchise
related and programming related. Table 8.1 lists the joint ventures
which will be discussed in this chapter. The programming joint
ventures are listed first followed by the franchise joint ventures.
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PROGRAMMING JOINT VENTURES
THE DISNEY CHANNEL
This was a joint venture between The Disney Corporation and Group
W Satellite. It was formed in 1981 and was dissolved in the fall of
1982. Both companies were considering establishing a pay channel when
the chairmen of the two parent corporations discussed it at a
Professional Golfers' Association function. Soon after that
discussion, formal negotiations were entered into and an agreement was
reached.
CONTRIBUTIONS--Disney provided the largest film library for children
in existence and also provided a name that is synonymous with quality
children's entertainment. Under the terms of the agreement Group W
Satellite was to provide the sales and marketing support, the
satellite transponders and the uplinking.
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MOTIVATIONS--Disney wanted to provide quality programming while at the
same time using the channel as a promotional vehicle for Epcot. Group
W Satellite wanted a channel that would be socially stimulating for
children. Lloyd Werner of Group W termed it a "safe haven" where
parents could be sure that their children were not being exposed to
programming with questionable content. 8 4
STRUCTURE--Each partner had 50% equity participation in the Disney
Channel. The Board of Directors had 2 Disney representatives and 2
Group W representatives so neither group had absolute control.
EVALUATION--The Disney Channel is now wholly owned by Disney. Jim
Jimerro, president of the Walt Disney Telecommunications unit, blames
the dissolution on Disney's lack of control. "We came to the
conclusion that we had to have creative control. I think the creative
control was the main [reason for the breakup] in both programming and
marketing. "5
Lloyd Werner says that disagreements arose at first over
marketing issues and then spilled over into issues concerning
programming and pricing strategies. Many of these issues had been
supposedly agreed to in the contract but one or the other of the
parties would raise objections nonetheless. Since control was divided
evenly there was no one party to decide matters. This lack of control
was cited by Werner as a major factor in the failure of the joint
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venture to endure.8 6
Werner also blames the dissolution on differing corporate
cultures and ways of doing business. He used Group W's partnership
with ABC Video in the Satellite News Channel as an example- of two
firms in the same business (broadcasting) having similar methods of
doing business. Disney, on the other hand, was a show business
company and was used to handling business deals in a manner different
than Group W was accustomed to. 8 7
The channel ultimately failed because there was no clear
agreement on who controlled the venture and because Disney eventually
felt that they could distribute the product effectively on their own.
SATELLITE NEWS CHANNEL
The Satellite News Channel (SNC) was a joint venture of Group W
Satellite and ABC Video Services. It was announced in August, 1981,
launched in June, 1982 and was bought out by Ted Turner in the fall of
1983. SNC offered 24 hour live news 365 days a year.
Group W Satellite first contacted ABC in order to negotiate a
deal for use of ABC's international news footage. ABC Video Services
then brought up the possibility of a joint venture and the deal
evolved from that point.
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CONTRIBUTIONS--Group W provided the news facility, local
news-gathering expertise, sales and marketing expertise, the satellite
transponders and the engineering skills. ABC Video contributed
international footage and enough cash to equal the value of Group W's
contributions.
MOTIVATIONS--Both partners wanted to produce a channel that would
provide the best news coverage available to the consumer. The joint
venture allowed Group W, which had been prepared to operate the
service on its own to set aside only half of the capital for the
project. It also provided Group W with the international footage it
needed.
According to industry sources, ABC was considering starting an
all-news channel before it learned of Group W's plans. ABC Video was
motivated in part by the belief that advertising could not support
more than two cable news channels. By forming a joint venture with
Group W, ABC was not only able to gain abilities that it did not
possess but was also able to avoid a potentially harmful competitive
situation. Furthermore, Jack Healy of ABC Video states that his
firm's motivations for entering any joint venture are to share risk
and to enter the market sooner than it would on its own. 8 8
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STRUCTURE--Each partner had 50% equity in the joint venture. However,
Group W had 3 of 5 representatives on the Board so it had control of
the operation. Lloyd Werner of Group W says that his company would
not agree to the joint venture.otherwise and ABC Video accepted the
arrangement.89
EVALUATION--The channel itself is no longer in existence but both
partners insist that this is a result of several business factors that
are totally unrelated to the ability of the partners to get along.
The main reasons for the sellout to Turner were the increased number
of competitors in the market segment and the failure to reach
projected levels of advertising revenues.
Although both partners suffered minor losses on SNC it was not a
failure as a joint venture since both partners feel that as a result
of combining strengths superb news programming was made available to
the public. The partners were able to work together effectively for
several reasons. The roles of both partners were clearly delineated
beforehand and it was obvious that Group W, with a majority control of
the Board had the legal power to take charge. The result was that no
important question was endlessly debated or left unresolved. It also
helped that the two companies were both in the broadcasting business.
They understood each other and were familiar with how each did
business which meant that communication was relatively smooth.
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ARTS AND ENTERTAINMENT CHANNEL
This is a programming channel that specializes in cultural,
upbeat entertainment. The service was initially formed as a joint
venture between Hearst and ABC Video Services. Rockefeller Center
Television joined the partnership in 1983.
CONTRIBUTIONS--After a year of research ABC created ABC Video whose
mission it was to create what became the ARTS Channel. ABC had
concluded that a cable programming channel would fit in nicely with
the strengths of the network. It was felt that a cultural channel
would be a good start since that kind of programming would be least
offensive to ABC's broadcast affiliates. ABC Video was involved with
purchasing European footage to use on the channel when Hearst, which
was already partners with ABC Video in the Daytime service, approached
with the idea of making the project a joint venture. Hearst
contributed its skills as a publisher of women's magazines. This is a
valuable asset since the target audience for this type of programming
is similar to the audience for a specialty magazine in that it is a
segment of the total population. Rockefeller brought a low cost
programming service, formerly The Entertainment Channel, and the
rights to BBC programming.
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MOTIVATIONS--ABC's feeling in entering the joint venture was that
Hearst would complement its strengths and the time span between
startup and profitability would be shortened. 9 0
Another reason for the initial ARTS partnership between ABC Video
and Hearst Corporation was given by Tony Herrling of ABC Video. The
two companies had agreed to produce Daytime as a joint venture and the
feeling was that a large portion of the costs involved in running two
different programming services could be cut if the services were
combined. As a result, Hearst became a partner with ABC in ARTS as
well as Daytime and both services had the same administrative and
marketing staffs. 91
STRUCTURE--The Arts and Entertainment Channel is run by a 9 man Board
with each company having 3 representatives. ABC Video and Hearst vote
in a block so they essentially run the show.
EVALUATION--Jack Healy of ABC Video likens a joint venture to being
married to several wives in that no matter how hard you try there are
going to be problems. The fact that Hearst is a private corporation
and ABC is publicly traded causes some difficulty according to Healy.
For example, Hearst measures its performance according to cash flow
while ABC is more concerned about earnings per share. Another example
is that people at ABC are used to paying bonuses whereas the
management at Hearst is not accustomed to this. Since they vote in a
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block there are times when compromises must be made.
Healy feels that the joint venture will succeed because of the
fact that the differences are minor and because each partner
contributes some skills that make the partnership stronger. 9 2
LIFETIME
This joint venture produces a channel specializing in
entertainment for women and health fanatics. The founding partners
were ABC Video and the Hearst Corporation. In the fall of 1983 Viacom
entertainment Services joined the partnership.
The channel started as Daytime in 1982 and became Lifetime in
1984 with the addition of Viacom's Cable Health Network. The channel
has never broken even but costs have always been at or below budget
and advertising revenue is increasing so the outlook is brightening.
CONTRIBUTIONS--ABC Video brought experience in producing programming
for daytime audiences. The Hearst Corporation brought expertise in
providing information targeted at women. Viacom brought the Cable
Health Network and its associated programming, additional transponder
time and subscribers. The additional subscribers are a key
contribution since the more subscribers a service has, the more
appealing it is to advertisers.
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MOTIVATIONS--The overriding goal of the partners in Jack Healy's
words, is "to make Lifetime a core service required to maintain a
basic subscriber." 9 3 Another prime motive for ABC Video is the
opportunity to spread the risk.
The motivation for becoming partners with Viacom was that the
Cable Health Network was aimed at the same audience that Daytime was
directed to. Combining the services meant an increase in viewers and
a greater appeal for advertisers. Finally, the cost to operate a
combined service is less than the cost of running two separate
services.
STRUCTURE--As is the case in the Arts and Entertainment Channel, ABC
Video and the Hearst Corporation each have 3 of 9 seats on the Board
and vote as a block. Viacom, however insisted on a long list of
exceptions which require an unanimous vote. These exceptions include
budget approval, approval of any shift from the present programming
format and pricing strategy approval.
EVALUATION--The joint venture appears to be running smoothly with no
apparent rifts between partners. The fact that ABC and Hearst have
been partners for a while helps as does the fact that Viacom and ABC
Video both have roots in broadcasting (Viacom was spun off from CBS)
and tend to have the same way of thinking.
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SPORTSCHANNEL
In 1983 the Washington Post paid Cablevision $20 million to get a
50% ownership of SportsChannel, a regional pay service featuring
sports programming.
CONTRIBUTIONS--Before the Washington Post approached Cablevision, the
MSO was operating the service on a low budget. The Washington Post
brought $20 million of much needed capital as well as expertise in the
publishing and information business. Cablevision provided the
established service as well as programming, marketing and management
skills.
MOTIVATIONS--The Washington Post wanted a vehicle through which to
enter the cable industry. It felt that a joint venture with a company
with considerable cable expertise would provide the best return on
investment.* Cablevision was happy to get both the cash and the
skills.
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STRUCTURE--Each partner has 50% of the equity in this joint venture.
EVALUATION--This joint venture is operating smoothly after a year.
Both partners cite the importance of bringing complementary skills to
the table. Alan Spoon, of the Washington Post feels that this
increases the chances for success. 9 4
THE PLAYBOY CHANNEL
The Playboy Channel, an erotic pay channel was a joint venture
between Cablevision, an MSO, and Playboy Inc. The association was
started with a handshake and was after two years without a legal
agreement being signed.
CONTRIBUTIONS--Playboy's main contribution to the arrangement was its
name and its programming expertise. Cablevision provided the sales
and marketing expertise.
MOTIVATIONS--Bob Sullivan, the chief financial officer for
Cablevision, says that the goals of the two firms were "similar but
not congruent." 9 5 By this he means that while both partners wanted to
produce a service that was known for its quality programming, each
partner had a slightly different definition of what quality meant.
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Both firms sought to have considerable input in the programming
decisions and a final agreement on this issue was never reached.
STRUCTURE--There was never any formal structure agreed to since an
agreement establishing the joint venture was never signed.
EVALUATION--In Sullivan's words, "after two years of operation without
a signed contract [the result] was a decision where Playboy said
they'd produce it their way and they'd let Cablevision market it to
affiliates.. .The decision was to go down the road side by side instead
of together." 9 6
The central issue in this instance was one of programming
control. The two firms had differing views on what constituted
acceptable programming on an erotic channel and even though they spent
years attempting to come to an agreement concerning this issue they
found it to be an impossible task. This is an indicator that the
companies' philosophies concerning programming were far apart and
deeply rooted.
Their present agreement, where Cablevision has no responsibility
for the editorial content, is going very well according to Sullivan.
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SPOTLIGHT
Spotlight was a pay service designed to compete with Cinemax, The
Movie Channel, HBO and Showtime. It was initiated by Times-Mirror and
in December, 1981, a joint venture was formed involving Times-Mirror
and four other MSOs: Cox, Cablevision, TCI and Storer.
CONTRIBUTIONS--Each partner contributed cash and subscribers (in many
cases Spotlight replaced the pay cable service that was originally
offered to subscribers of cable systems owned by one of Spotlight's
partners) to the venture.
MOTIVATIONS--The purpose of this joint venture was to eliminate the
middleman costs 9 7 and to combat some of the power held by HBO. 98 The
partners felt that "Spotlight could start saving money by eliminating
affiliate relations and marketing costs--no need to market to the
owners or hold their hands. More importantly, there's the
contribution the pay services make to their corporate parents' bottom
line." 9 9 The partners hoped to keep that profit for themselves.
STRUCTURE--The equity contribution varied with the number of
subscribers. Cablevision, for example, had a 10% share of the joint
venture.
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EVALUATION--Cablevision left the joint venture after less than a year
and in early 1984 the rest of the partnership was dissolved with
Showtime/The Movie Channel gaining the Spotlight subscribers.
Bob Sullivan of Cablevision points to lack of control as the main
problem. "Everyone has to agree who's running the store [but] no one
took the lead." 10 0 Sullivan pointed out that although all five
partners had the same broad goals for the venture--taking some of the
power from HBO--they had other firm-specific goals which conflicted.
As a result, "getting all five MSOs to talk to each other
intelligently [was] almost an impossibility."10'
Jack Kent Cooke, the president of Spotlight, concurs with this
assessment, in part, stating that the demise was due to an inability
to "sustain acceptable profitability given its relatively low number
of potential subscribers and the differing commercial objectives of
the partners." 10 2
Sullivan is not surprised at the end result since he says that
this is a typical pattern for joint ventures. "You start with what
you think is a good idea and then you tend to break up into the
constituent units. You get a lot of chiefs and a lot of different
viewpoints." 10 3 Since Spotlight did not have a designated leader with
the power to make decisions on conflicts the joint venture dissolved.
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SHOWTIME-THE MOVIE CHANNEL
Showtime was a pay service formed in 1977 by Viacom in an effort
to compete with HBO. For a number of years it was a joint venture
with TelePrompTer and then Group W (after the acquisition of
TelePrompTer). Group W sold its share of Showtime to Viacom in 1982
citing control issues. For a number of months Viacom was in the
market for a partner or partners. A potential deal with a number of
movie studios fell through in the summer of 1983 because the justice
department disapproval of the. venture on antitrust grounds. Finally,
in the fall of 1983, Showtime, the second largest pay channel merged
with The Movie Channel, the third largest pay service to make Warner
Communication Inc., Warner Amex and Viacom joint venture partners.
CONTRIBUTIONS--In this joint venture the partners brought much more
than cash to the table. Both Warner Amex and Viacom are MSOs so they
both brought outlets for the pay service. Viacom brought a channel
with approximately 4.7 million present subscribers and differentiated
programming. Warner and Warner Amex brought an all-movie service and
approximately 2 million subscribers. Warner Communications had
strength in movie production as owners of Warner Bros. Studios.
Viacom brought syndication expertise, rapidly becoming an important
skill since shows produced for pay cable are now being syndicated for
presentation on broadcast stations.
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MOTIVATIONS--According to Dave Fluhrer of Viacom, his company wanted a
partner for Showtime since it has "always been interested in joint
ventures because you spread risk around and share resources." 1 0 4
Fluhrer states that the additional advantages to all three firms are:
O Economies of scale--combining the staffs of the two services
saved an estimated $15-20 million, because now that one
organization takes care of all the administration and
marketing.
O Resources of the new partners.
O Larger subscriber base.
O Partnership is now more attractive to the investment
community--soon after the merger was announced it obtained
a $150 million line of credit which was not secured by the
parent companies.
The goal of the new firm is simply to compete successfully with HBO.
STRUCTURE--The equity is divided up as follows: Viacom, 50%, Warner
Communications, 31%, and Warner Amex, 19%. However, if Warner
Communications and Warner Amex vote in a block, this joint venture
would perform much like a 50/50 joint venture.
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EVALUATION--The merger resulted in two services that can now be easily
marketed as a package to produce formidable competition for the highly
popular pay package of HBO and Cinemax, which are both owned by Time,
Inc. As a business idea it appears to be a very viable competitive
strategy. Whether or not the partners can work together remains to be
seen.
TRI STAR
This joint venture between HBO, CBS and Columbia is a film
production company. It was announced in 1982 and to date has
distributed one movie and produced and distributed another.
CONTRIBUTIONS--Each partner contributed 1/3 of the capital. The
specific strengths of the partners were HBO's pay television markets,
CBS's television distribution capabilities and Columbia's production
expertise and theater distribution experience.
MOTIVATIONS--Each firm wanted a guaranteed supply of product for its
particular market. Laurie Goodman of HBO was very specific in
explaining her firm's reasons for entering the joint venture. HBO
went into the venture at a time when film costs were escalating and it
was felt that it was better to take a long term, up-front risk with
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Tri Star than to be entirely dependent on the vagaries of the market.
The intent was to gain some control of the supply of product and be
less subject to losses incurred when film prices shot up due to a
dearth of quality product. 10 5
STRUCTURE--Each company has 1/3 representation on the Board.
EVALUATION--The firms had had experience dealing with each other
before so the opportunity was there to sound each other out before the
deal was agreed upon. To date, the joint venture appears to be
working.
WARNER AMEX
This is arguably the best known cable joint venture in the
country. It was formed in 1979 when American Express paid Warner
Communications $175 million for 50% ownership of Warner's cable
operations. The company is composed of two subsidiaries: Warner Amex
Cable, an MSO responsible for cable franchises and Warner Amex
Satellite Entertainment Corporation which produces cable programming.
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CONTRIBUTIONS--Warner provided its extensive cable network which in
1979 was the fifth largest in the country. Thus, they had
considerable expertise in franchise operations. Although Warner had
no direct cable programming expertise they had a number of people who
had considerable experience in radio and television production.
American Express contributed cash--lots of it. While it is true
that American Express certainly had marketing and credit expertise
(the latter is useful for transactional services done through Qube) it
does not seem that these attributes were called upon to a large
extent. In fact, one Warner Amex employee, when asked what American
Express brought to the joint venture besides cash, replied, "I don't
know." iOG
Cablevision's Bob Sullivan, who was with American Express when
the joint venture was completed, claims that "American Express brought
nothing to the party except money...they brought no management."1 0 7
MOTIVATIONS--American Express wanted to enter the cable industry
because it had a desire to enter a growth industry to counterbalance
the mature insurance industry. Cable was appealing because it was
involved with communications and had the potential to provide
synergies with American Express' current businesses through
interactive services. American Express sought a partner with
experience in the business and felt that Warner provided the best fit.
Warner's immediate goal at the time of the agreement was to acquire
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capital so that it could compete for new franchises.
STRUCTURE--Each partner has a 50% equity position and 50% control of
the joint venture. Each shareholder has first refusal rights in the
event that the other shareholder desires to sell its stock.
EVALUATION--Warner Amex is still in existence after five years amid
severe franchise difficulties and rumors of a dissolution. A recent
Business Week article reported that Warner Amex's 1982 net loss was
$47 million and that this figure increased to $91 million in 1983. 108
Like a number of other companies, Warner Amex became embroiled in
the recent franchise bidding wars and agreed to expensive provisions
in order to secure the franchise. When interest rates shot up in 1980
and 1981, construction financing costs increased and Warner Amex found
itself in difficulty.
Other companies were faced with the same problems and Warner Amex
has fared more poorly than most. It happens that this is another case
of uncertain control. In the early years of the joint venture,
according to Sullivan "they were 50/50 partners which means that
nobody did anything. They were so courteous to each other.. .that the
inmates ran the asylum. No one exercised control. No one who was
responsible financially."1 0 9 The implication is that if Warner had
taken the lead at the inception, then the joint venture quite possibly
could have avoided some of its poor franchise decisions.
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FRANCHISE JOINT VENTURES
TELEPROMPTER-HUGHES FRANCHISE JOINT VENTURES
In 1966, TelePrompTer, a leading MSO, and Hughes Aircraft formed
two joint ventures to capture cable franchises in Los Angeles and New
York. Theta Cable was the L.A. joint venture and Hughes had a 51%
equity position. TelePrompTer had 51% of the equity in Manhattan CATV
Corporation.
CONTRIBUTIONS--In each case TelePrompTer brought management expertise
to the deal. Hughes brought technical expertise as well as money. In
fact, management at TelePrompTer first met the Hughes team when they
needed a microwave hookup to transmit programming from building to
building in Manhattan, eliminating the need to go underground.1 10
In L.A. the Hughes reputation was very important in securing the
franchise and in New York, Kahn believes that the TelePrompTer
reputation led to the winning of that franchise.
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MOTIVATIONS--The immediate goal of the partners was to secure the two
franchises. Hughes had a bigger stake in the projects than simply
being a joint venture partner would indicate since it also owned
600,000 shares of TelePrompTer.*
STRUCTURE--As was mentioned earlier, Hughes had 51% of the L.A.
franchise and 49% of the New York franchise. In both cases, however,
"TelePrompTer managed and ran the systems.""'
Irving Kahn, the chairman of TelePrompTer at the time, stated in
a recent interview that there was not much of a formal structure.
Management of both parents were comfortable with each other and it was
agreed that TelePrompTer would be in control of daily operations
regardless of equity participation. They arranged the equity
participation this way because the franchising authorities in each
city wanted the company they were familiar with to have the majority
interest.112
EVALUATION--These joint ventures lasted in one form or another,
through several changes of TelePrompTer's management until 1981 when
TelePrompTer bought Hughes out. For much of that time the franchises
were operating at a loss as a result of high construction costs and
lower than estimated subscriber revenues.
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GROUP W CABLE FRANCHISE JOINT VENTURES
In 1981, Westinghouse Broadcasting and Cable Co., whose parent
company is The .Westinghouse Corporation, bought TelePrompTer whose
holdings included the Los Angeles and New York franchises discussed
above. This purchase made Group W Cable the third largest MSO in the
country.
Group W Cable owns approximately 140 systems, less than 5% of
which are joint ventures according to George O'Hanasian of Group W
Cable.
CONTRIBUTIONS--In all of the franchise joint ventures that Group W
makes, it supplies the management expertise and the bulk of the cash.
The local investor or investors supplies the political clout that is
sometimes necessary to win a franchise.
MOTIVATIONS--Group W Cable's goal is to win the franchise and as a
result it will enter into a joint venture with a local investor if
"that will increase the probability of winning." 1 1 3 It was mentioned
in an earlier chapter that competition for a franchise is usually
fierce. The idea is to get local support so that the franchise
committee looks most favorably on your application.
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Local investors are motivated by the potential to make a nice
profit for a minimal investment.
STRUCTURE--This varies but the predominating figure seems to be 80%
equity for Group W Cable and 20% equity for the partner. This
percentage allows maximum accounting benefits. Group W Cable, in all
instances manages the system and is in complete control of daily
operations.
EVALUATION--Group W enters a joint venture with local investors only
as a last resort. The local partners' value lies mainly in the
influence they have in getting the franchise for Group W Cable.
Despite this, the joint ventures run smoothly. This is attributable
to the fact that the partners do not have conflicting goals. Group W
wants to win a franchise and then manage it so that long run profit is
maximized. Group W has legal control of the venture and it is in the
local investors' best interest to interfere as little as possible
since Group W has the management expertise.
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WARNER AMEX CABLE FRANCHISE JOINT VENTURES
Warner Amex Cable is the subsidiary of Warner Amex the multiple
cable system operator. It controls approximately 125 systems, over
95% of which are wholly-owned.
CONTRIBUTIONS--Like Group W, Warner Amex Cable looks for the local
investor to provide help in obtaining a franchise. Warner Amex Cable
provides management expertise and a good investment.
MOTIVATIONS--The primary motivation is to win the franchise. Warner
Amex entered joint ventures with local partners in Cincinnati and
Pittsburgh because the message from the cities and the strategies of
the competition dictated that this would be the best course to take.
STRUCTURE--Warner Amex Cable has an 80% equity share in the Pittsburgh
system with the remaining 20% going to minority organizations. In
Cincinnati, the minority partnerships went to civic groups. In both
cases, Warner Amex Cable was in charge of managing the system.
EVALUATION--Warner Amex Cable has been in the headlines lately because
it has had financial difficulties with new builds in their large city
franchises. The difficulties do not appear to be a result in any way
of squabbles with the minority partners.
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Warner Amex Cable has never joint ventured with another MSO but
it is considering doing just that with Viacom in Milwaukee. Viacom
owns operating franchises in the suburbs and Warner Amex Cable has the
right to wire the city of Milwaukee. However, due to its financial
difficulties, Warner Amex Cable is seeking a partner to help defray
the costs. Viacom would provide capital and management expertise
specific to cable operations in Milwaukee. The joint venture, if
agreed upon, would also provide considerable administrative and
marketing cost savings since one staff would take the place of two.
CONTINENTAL CABLEVISION FRANCHISE JOINT VENTURES
Continental Cablevision is the country's tenth largest MSO with
approximately 75 systems and 696,000 subscribers. Like the other MSOs
that have been discussed, Continental Cablevision has entered very few
joint ventures but in recent years it has entered into a few joint
ventures in large franchises. Two of these joint ventures will be
discussed here and will be treated separately since the partners for
each venture are considerably different.
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Springfield
In 1981, Continental Cablevision won the Springfield franchise of
60,000 homes as an equal partner with a group consisting of the
Tribune, Scripps-Howard, and a private investor.
CONTRIBUTIONS--This joint venture came about after the Springfield
franchise committee rejected all of the first round applications and
invited rebids. Continental Cablevision and the other group both felt
that they were the two leading contenders for the bid and that their
chances of winning would be excellent if they submitted a combined
bid. So, besides each group contributing half of the cash, they gave
each other a sense that together they were stronger than they were
apart as far as winning the franchise was concerned.
MOTIVATIONS--As in most of the franchise joint ventures the goal was
to win the franchise. Each partner felt that part of the pie was
better than no pie at all and that combining forces would enable them
to win the pie.
STRUCTURE--Initially, equity was 50% each and the Board was divided
evenly between the two groups. Currently, after the selling of stock,
Continental Cablevision has 70% of the equity.
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Continental Cablevision has always had the management contract to
operate the system and the Board has been comfortable in letting it
control the daily operations. Out of all the partners Continental
Cablevision clearly had the most management expertise.
EVALUATION--No crisis has come up in the three years of operation. It
is clear that Continental Cablevision has control of this joint
venture.
Chicago
In early 1984, Continental Cablevision won one of Chicago's five
franchise areas in a joint venture with a group of minority
businessmen.
CONTRIBUTIONS--The franchise committee made it clear that they wanted
minorities represented so the minority group satisfied that criterion.
They also brought considerable business acumen and an excellent
reputation to a cable venture whose franchise area is 63% black.
Continental Cablevision brings its system expertise to the
partnership.
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MOTIVATIONS--Once again, the motivation for the joint venture on
Continental Cablevision's part was to win the franchise.
STRUCTURE--Each group has a 50% share of the equity. Continental
Cablevision will manage the system but some subcommittees are not
always controlled by Continental Cablevision. This could lead to
confusion in the future.
EVALUATION--Since this joint venture has just been consummated there
is no past history to judge it on. It is likely to succeed since the
two partners have separate and complementary strengths--Continental
Cablevision has the management expertise and the local group has
extensive knowledge of how business is conducted in the community.
CABLEVISION FRANCHISE JOINT VENTURES
Cablevision owns less than ten systems but one of them, on Long
Island, is the second largest system in the country with over 200,000
subscribers. It has entered franchise joint ventures with
Scripps-Howard in three locations: Fairfield and Bridgeport,
Connecticut and Sacramento, California.
PAGE 123
CONTRIBUTIONS--Scripps-Howard brings a journalistic background and
publishing expertise as well as capital. Cablevision provides system
expertise in both installation and management.
MOTIVATIONS--Unlike the previous franchise joint ventures that have
been discussed, Cablevision's primary motivation for taking a partner
is not to secure the franchise, although that is certainly a
consideration, but to be able to have the finances to build it when it
is won.
Scripps-Howard, like many publishers is interested in the cable
business as an alternative way of delivering its information. These
joint ventures provide Scripps-Howard with an entry into the industry
without the responsibility of managing a business it knows nothing
about.
STRUCTURE--The structure of the joint ventures are extremely
complicated as far as equity is concerned. The plan allows for
Scripps-Howard to receive virtually all of the tax benefits at first
with the stipulation that these savings are to be reinvested in the
joint ventures. Eventually, the two firms will be 50/50 equity
partners.
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As far as control of the operations of the franchises is
concerned Bob Sullivan states that it is written into the contracts
that Chuck Dolan (the president of Cablevision) is the general
partner. 114 In other words, both partners have agreed that Cablevision
is running the show.
EVALUATION--Both partners appear to be happy with the relationship as
is evidenced by the fact that they are now in three joint ventures
together. Although Bob Sullivan states that Cablevision does not
"want a partner with just deep pockets that brings nothing other than
money to the party," 1 15 it appears that money is Scripps-Howard's
largest contribution. It will be interesting to observe how
Scripps-Howard's publishing expertise is put to use in the joint
venture.
Regardless of whether or not cash was the primary motivation for
making the deal, the key element to remember about this series of
joint ventures is that Cablevision is in control.
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CONCLUSION
Before summarizing the crucial elements and motivations that
typify a successful cable joint venture, it is necessary to define
what we mean by successful. Initially, we had planned to designate a
joint venture as a success if it had achieved or was achieving its
original goals. This definition does not, however, take into account
the fact that in the dynamic business environments which are common
for new products, a firm's goals often change as the competitive
environment changes. Hence, it is unreasonable to term a joint
venture a failure because it did not achieve goals that were
established given assumptions that no longer were accurate.
Taking this into consideration, our definition of a successful
joint venture is one in which the partners had a harmonius working
relationship with their final goals being achieved or one the road to
achievement. Put another way, a joint venture that did not meet its
initial goals is still a success in a joint venture relationship if
the failure to meet the goals was caused by incorrect planning and
assumptions and not by any problems with the relationship itself.
Given this definition, Table 8.2 lists our evaluations of
successful and unsuccessful joint ventures.
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CABLE JOINT VENTURE EVALUATION.
SUCCESSFUL TOO EARLY TO TELL
ARTS ARTS and Entertainment
Cablevision Cont. Cablevision--Chicago
Continental Cable- Lifetime
vision--Springfield
Daytime Showtime-TMC
Group W Cable Franchises SportsChannel
Satellite News Channel
TelePrompTer-Hughes
Tri Star
UNSUCCESSFUL
Disney Channel
PlayboyChannel
Spotlight
Warner Amex
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Table 8. 2
MOTIVATIONS
Table 8.3 lists the various motivations for joint venture
activity given by the joint venture partners covered in this chapter.
Numerous reasons were given for entering programming joint ventures.
Four motivating factors were cited most often:
O To gain the skills needed to successfully compete
O Allow quicker entry into the market
O Spread risk
o Gain market power
System operators, on the other hand, tended to form joint
ventures for a much smaller variety of reasons. Joint ventures with
other than local partners were made not only to improve the chances of
winning the franchise but also for complementary skills and capital.
CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS
We have determined from studying these joint ventures and
interviewing the individuals involved in putting them together and
running them that four conditions are vital in order for joint venture
partners to have an optimal chance of an effective working
relationship. These are:
O Complementary skills
O Complementary company cultures
O Non-conflicting goals
0 Clear control
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CABLE JOINT VENTURE MOTIVATIONS.
JOINT VENTURE PARENTS MOTIVATIONS
Disney Channel
Satellite News
Channel
ARTS and
Entertainment
Lifetime
Disney
Group W Satellite
ABC Video
Group W Satellite
Hearst
ABC Video
Rockefeller Center TV
Hearst
Viacom
ABC Video
SportsChannel
Playboy Channel.
Spotlight
Cablevision
Washington Post
Playboy
Cablevision
Cablevision
Storer
Cox
TCI
Times-Mirror
Marketing Expertise
Access to Film Library
Complementary Skills
Reduce Competition
Increase Market Power
Quicker Market Entry
Reduce Capital Outlay
Share Risk
Economies of Scale
Complementary Skills
Quicker Market Entry
Share Risk
Complementary Skills
Economies of Scale
Increase Market Power
Share Risk
Complementary Skills
Cash
Complementary Skills
Market Power
Share Risk
Showtime-The
Movie Channel
Tri Star
Warner Amex
Warner Communications
Warner Amex
Viacom
HBO
Columbia Pictures
CBS
Warner
Communications
American Express
Economies of Scale
Market Power
Subscribers
Cash
Complementary Skills
Market Power
Complementary Skills
Cash
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Table 8. 3
Table 8.3 CABLE JOINT VENTURE MOTIVATIONS (continued).
JOINT VENTURE PARENTS MOTIVATIONS
Theta Cable
Manhattan CATV
Group W Cable
Franchises
Warner Amex Cable
Franchises
Continental Cable-
vision Franchises
Cablevision
Franchises
Hughes Aircraft
TelePrompTer
Group W Cable
Local Investors
WACC
Local Investors
Continental Cablevision
Local Investors (Chicago)
Competing System
Operator (Springfield)
Cablevision
Scripps-Howard
Cash
Win Franchise
Win Franchise
Win Franchise
Win Franchise
Local Expertise
Comp. Skills
Complementary Skills
Cash
Complementary Skills--In all of the joint ventures that we termed
successful each partner contributed at least one skill central to the
business success of the joint venture that no other partner had. This
served to make the partners dependent on one another, and fostered a
spirit of teamwork, since the partners realized, quite well, that they
could not achieve business success on their own. Also, in cases where
one partner believed that it could do its partner's specialty better,
it set the stage for conflict and an ineffective relationship.
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Complementary Company Cultures--Anyone who has visited a foreign
country has probably spent some time getting used to customs and
beliefs that are different from those in America. Some people,
especially those who have traveled before, adjust quicker than others
while some never can accept the fact that there are suitable ways of
doing things other than what they are used to.
Joint venture partners encounter much the same problem when they
enter a partnership. It is crucial that joint venture partners be
able to work together harmoniously. In order to do that, possibly
conflicting corporate cultures must be reconciled. This is especially
necessary in joint ventures where control is not clearly in the hands
of one of the parents.
We concluded from our research that joint ventures were more
likely to succeed the more that the parents had in common. For
example, Group W and ABC are both broadcasting companies and talked
the same language. The result was minimal communications problems
between the parents.
On the other hand, the Group W, Disney partnership fell through
due in large part to a failure to communicate effectively. The Disney
people were movie producers, not broadcasters and the two groups did
business in different ways that were never reconciled.
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This is not to say that a joint venture between firms in
different businesses will not be successful. Tri Star appears to be
working well as did Daytime and ARTS. The key element is that the
partners in all of these joint ventures had either dealt with each
other before and thus were familiar with the habits of their
prospective partners or had recognized this issue as a potential
problem and have taken steps to adapt.
We have concluded that companies with different corporate
cultures can work effectively as joint venture partners but that they
have an uphill battle in front of them. The problem is eased somewhat
when the firms have done business before and it causes the least
trouble when the attitudes of the potential partners are similar.
Non-conflicting Goals--In all of the joint ventures that were
successful, the partners had goals which, even if not identical, did
not conflict. This is not surprising since it does not make much
sense to enter an arrangement with a partner that wants to achieve a
goal that is detrimental to your goals. A common occurrence was that
the partners would agree to loosely worded objectives and then
discover when the work started, either that the true objectives of the
separate partners were not similar or that they disagreed on the best
way to achieve the goals. These disagreements were more likely to be
overcome when one of the partners had the power to make the final
decision.
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Clear Control--The ingredient that emerged time and again as being the
most useful factor in determining the success of a joint venture
involved the issue of control. In all of the successful cases except
one (Tri Star) there is no doubt about which partner has control of
the operation. In all of the joint ventures that we have termed
failures there has been considerable doubt over which partner had the
final say in certain decisions.
We therefore feel that it is paramount for the control issues to
be decided entirely to the satisfaction of both parties before a joint
venture agreement is signed. Whenever possible, one party should be
given the right to have the final word in all decisions. We realize
that many firms are reluctant to give away that power but in our
sample the joint ventures that have lasted have been those where one
partner was in control.
COMPARISON WITH THEORY
For the most part, our findings regarding cable joint venture
motivations and success factors coincided with joint venture studies
done concerning manufacturing firms. We have seen that the structure
of the cable industry matches the profile given in the literature of
an industry which is prone to forming joint ventures since it is a
high growth industry with several high entry barriers. The four
reasons mentioned the most frequently for entering joint
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ventures--complementary skills, risk spreading, quicker market entry
and attainment of market power--were all listed as reasons for forming
joint ventures in the literature.
We have concluded that, just as the literature maintains, it is
necessary to have complementary skills, and an "impedance match"
between the cultures of the partners if a joint venture is to have a
good chance of becoming a viable entity.
Our research on the cable industry has also led us to identify
two success factors that get little emphasis in the joint venture
literature--non-conflicting goals and the control issue. These are
very closely related since we found that where goals conflicted and no
one party had total control, the partnership was not long for this
world. When it has been agreed that one partner is in charge that is
a sign that the partner conceding the control feels that the first
partner's goals are fairly well in line with its own. Our finding
that most successful ventures are ones where one partner is clearly
established as the controlling partner, coincides quite well with the
finding cited in chapter 3 that chemical company joint ventures of two
partners are more stable when the equity split is 51/49.
Finally, although joint venture types have not been emphasized in
this thesis, it is interesting to note that the joint ventures formed
by system operators to win franchises do not fit any of the four
general types--market/distribution, R&D exploration,
production/mining, and construction/land development--covered in the
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literature. We have classified these franchise joint ventures as
political joint ventures.
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9VIDEOTEX INDUSTRY INTRODUCTION
9.1 History and Definition of Videotex
In reality, no videotex system has "full service" capabilities.
Only a system that provides text, graphics, video and audio two-way
communication will truly be able to offer the complete range of the
five general types of videotex services: information retrieval,
transaction processing, messaging, computational and telemonitoring
services (see Table 9.1). However, four quite different types of
videotex systems have developed for particular industries that provide
one or more of these services:
O The Cable Industry
O The Personal Computer Industry
O The Financial Industry
O The European, Japanese and Canadian Governments
The economics of videotex predicts that these systems will ultimately
be compatible. Many signs of the emergence of this single standard
have begun surfacing.
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Table 9.1. VIDEOTEX SERVICES.1 1 6
TYPE OF SERVICE NAME OF SERVICE DESCRIPTION
Information Retrieval Electronic publishing
Library/reference service
Community services
Health services
Entertainment services
Foreign language services
Directory services
Education services
Advertising services
Electronic newspapers,
newsletters, magazines
encyclopedias, books, etc.
Specialty database access,
electronic catalog.
Community, transit/travel,
government, housing,
shopping information.
Medical, first aid,
poison control hotline
information.
Electronic jukebox, On-
demand TV, electronic
entertainment hotlines.
Foreign language trans-
lations of information,
captioning of TV programs.
Open or closed systems for
providing listings of
employees, buildings,
stores, hours of service,
telephone numbers.
Course listings, computer
assisted instruction,
special services for home
.bound students, supple-
mental materials for
education TV programs,
do-it-yourself training,
literacy training.
Electronic yellow pages,
Supplement to TV ad.,
classified advertising,
display advertising
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Table 9.1 VIDEOTEX SERVICES (continued)
TYPE OF SERVICE NAME OF SERVICE DESCRIPTION
TRANSACTIONAL Financial services Electronic checkbook,
funds transfer, credit
cards, stock and bond
trading, etc.
Sales transactions
Entertainment transactions
Electronic Mail
Conferencing
Referenda
Closed user group services
Game services
Computing services
Information storage
Telework
TELENONITORING Home security
Health and saftey monitors
Energy management
Electronic catalogs that
allow purchase of items.
On-line gambling,
electronic box office.
Point-to-point or point-
to many messaging.
Textual real-time
communications.
Citizen input to gov't
Consumer action groups,
special interest groups,
business organizaticns,
communicate in private
part of system.
Video games downloaded
to home computers.
For additional computing
power.
Private files.
Text editing, file mainte-
nance, data entry and
analysis as extension to
the office.
Remote fire sensors and
burglar alarms for police
and fire protection.
Assist in at-home care
with ECG, blood pressure
remote readings.
Control and regulation of
household and business
energy use. Meter
reading.
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MESSAGING
COMPUTING
9.1.1 The Cable Industry
Two way communication of textual and graphics information also
called videotex services, was mentioned back in the sixties by
visionary cable equipment suppliers such as General Instrument, who
speculated about the future uses of cable in their annual reports. 117
In 1972, a Warner Communications Inc. subsidiary, Warner Cable may
have performed the first experiment in videotex services in
collaboration with Mitre Corp. This experiment involved linking up a
community in Reston, Virginia to a computerized cable system through
which home users could receive many forms of the typical five videotex
services: information retrieval, transactional, messaging, computing
and telemonitoring.118
The recession of 1974 - 1975 caused Warner Cable to abandon this
project until 1977 when they established a complete, fully working
model videotex system in Columbus, Ohio called QUBE. The development
of this system was clearly a strategy to win the large urban cable
franchises. In an attempt to add credibility to these franchise
proposals that would cost hundreds of millions in capital investment,
Warner joined forces with a financial power, American Express, to form
Warner Amex Cable Communications (WACC) in 1979. As a result, WACC
won such urban franchises as Manhattan, Dallas, Milwaukee and
Pittsburgh.1 1 9 Furthermore, they forced the other major MSOs to
develop competitive videotex systems. The competition for franchises
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forced acknowledgement of a truely powerful technology, videotex.
9.1.2 The Personal Computer Industry
Still another form of videotex is emerging as the number of
microcomputer owners grows. These curious and industrious users log
into the so called information utilities - like The Source, owned by
Reader's Digest; Compuserve, owned by H & R Block; and the Dow Jones
News/Retrieval Service - which provide many of the same services as
other videotex systems. For example, a microcomputer user can log
onto an information utility to get the news, a special food recipe or
a stock quote; to manage an investment portfolio or the home budget;
to pay debts through an on-line bank; or to send messages and
converse with others using the system. However, since these services
must be compatible with the various home computers, they only offer
textual (ASCII) two-way services. 12 0 This has limited the acceptance
of these services because the price is carried completely by the user.
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9.1.3 The Financial Industry
Another approach to videotex has been taken by financial service
companies as a way to reduce the costs of completing transactions and
of providing information. Thus, retail companies such as Sears have
participated in numerous videotex trials 1 2 1 and the major banks have
developed some 175 to 200 automated teller machine networks across the
country or have offered home banking services through home
computers.122 The home banking services often offer many more of the
five general types of videotex services than just transaction
processing services. However, once again these services allow two-way
communication of only textual information.
9.1.4 The European, Japanese and Canadian Governments
Meanwhile, videotex in other developed nations has taken on a
different look, since these services have been strongly
government-supported. PRESTEL, the largest and oldest full graphics
and text videotex system was offered by British Telecom in 1979.123
Also, the government of France made a commitment to full graphics
videotex in 1980 when they decided not only to develop a commercial
videotex system, now known as the Antiope System, but also to use
videotex terminals in public places to give the public access to a
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complete electronic phone directory for France by 1990-124 Japan's
public telephone and telegraph company also introduced a graphics and
textual graphic system in the early 80s that was similar to the
PRESTEL system. 125 Canada has developed and begun marketing a higher
resolution graphics and text videotex system known as Telidon.126
The Canadians state-of-the-art in videotex services has been
given broad approval by numerous vendors in the United States, which
may result in the emergence of a videotex standard. The most
important of these moves to approve a standard was the American
National Standards Institute's acceptance of the North American
Presentation Level Protocol Standard, a modification of the Telidon
standard offered by AT & T and endorsed by companies like Digital
Electronics Corporation and National Cash Register. 127 Furthermore,
one of the top ten cable MSOs, Times Mirror has joined forces with
Infomart, a major videotex software developer in Canada, to begin
offering full graphics and textual two-way services in the Los Angeles
area. At least three other services offering full NAPLPS videotex
will be offered in particular American geographic markets by the end
of 1984. To top this off, IBM, Sears and CBS recently announced a
joint venture to develop and market a videotex system which will be
fully compatible, and possibly more advanced than the NAPLPS systems
now being offered; however, their system will not be available for
several years. 128 Since three out of five of these videotex services
will be provided by joint ventures, we will concentrate our
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discussions around NAPLPS videotex services which offer full text and
graphics.
9.2 The Components of the Videotex Industry
The videotex industry is usually described as having three
components:
O The Information Supplier
O The System Operator
O The Communications Network Supplier
These components are similar to the three components of the cable
industry: the program supplier (the information provider), the MSO
(the system operator), and the satellite company (the communications
network supplier). Although we will be focusing our discussion on the
videotex system operator, a thorough discussion of these components is
necessary to understand the reason that most of the full text and
graphics videotex system operators are joint ventures.
9.2.1 The Information Supplier
The information supplier collects and assembles data into a
usable form (i.e. gathers and processes information) and then
supplies this database to the videotex system operator for
distribution. Information suppliers should be recognized as suppliers
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to the videotex industry, composed of the system operator and the
communications network supplier. Since every user of a videotex
service uses upstream connections to distribute information (as
defined by a two-way communication system), every user is an
information provider; however, the first and most important suppliers
for videotex systems are already information suppliers for other
networks, like the cable or newspaper networks. To enter the videotex
information supplier business these organizations have simply begun
putting their information into an electronic database compatible with
videotex systems. These include four types of organizations:
o Publishing companies
o Service organizations
o Advertisers
o Special-interest organizations
9.2.1.1 Publishing Companies
These companies provide newspapers, magazines, journals, books,
videotapes, records, computer software and movies. They distribute
their information either through direct channels such as newspaper
stands, mailorder houses, and book, record and computer stores or
through more indirect channels such as movie theaters, television, or
radio. Videotex to these companies is simply another direct channel
for distribution of their information.
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9.2.1.2 Service Organizations
Service organizations provide financial, retail, wholesale and
other transactional services, as well as consulting services. Each of
these services require the distribution of information. For example,
consider a financial service company that provides its customers or
salesmen with company reports, stock quotes, investment advice and
economic or market statistics. Each transaction that these companies
make also involves supplying information to buyers and suppliers in a
two-way communication setting. Therefore, service organizations see
videotex as a means of reducing their information distribution costs
to remain competitive.
9.2.1.3 Advertisers
Advertisers provide information about their products to potential
customers. With the implementation of graphics into videotex systems
and as the number of users of videotex systems increases, advertisers
can directly benefit from distributing their product information on
videotex systems. In fact, advertisers will be willing to pay for
their use of the system to defray the cost of the videotex services
while increasing the number of users.
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9.2.1.4 Special-Interest Organizations
These organizations provide information to their members in the
form of newsletters, journals, meetings, books, etc. As with the
other information providers, special-interest organizations supply
information to videotex systems to reduce the costs of distributing
their information.
9.2.2 The System Operator
The system operator manages the videotex services as a two-way
channel for information distribution. These system operators access
and store the databases generated by the information suppliers and
provide information buyers access to these databases. Thus, the
system operator is interested in how the information is received from
the information suppliers, how it is stored and accessed for
transmission, and how information buyers are billed.
Because the system operator acts as a middleman between the
information supplier and the information buyer, the relationship
between information supplier and the system operator is quite complex.
Expertise in the service and publishing industries may improve these
close relationships with information suppliers. Furthermore, computer
and communications orientation is essential for the videotex system
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operator since these technologies pervade every strategy affecting the
operations of the connection between information supplier and buyer.
9.2.3 The Communication Network Supplier
The communications network supplier transmits the electronic form
of information from information supplier to system operator and from
systems operator to information buyer. The network supplied can be a
combination of seven different communications technologies: broadcast
television, packet switched or switched telephone, cable television,
FM radio, multipoint distribution systems, or direct broadcast
satellite. The cost of two-way communication is lowest for cable
television and telephone technologies; therefore, these two
communication network technologies have received the widest acceptance
for use in videotex systems.
At the moment, one of the major costs of videotex systems is the
cost of sending information through communications networks. This
means that the evolution of deregulation in the communications
industry and its effect on communication cost structures will be
immensely important to the growth of videotex systems operators.
Thus, close relationships between the communications network provider
and the system operator will increase the likelihood of a successful
videotex system.
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10
VIDEOTEX INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
Since we used Porter's competitive analysis technique 12 9 to
describe the structure of the cable industry, we will compare the
cable industry to the videotex industry using this same technique.
While the cable industry is maturing, the videotex industry is in its
infancy. This forces us to look at the videotex industry as a single
industry rather than breaking it into information providers (analogous
to programming services in the cable industry) and system operators
(analogous to cable system operators in the cable industry). Although
both segments of the videotex industry do exist, the prominent
videotex companies are presently vying for positions in the system
operator industry. Similarly, the cable industry in the 1950s, 60s
and the early 70s was predominantly composed of system operators. The
development of addressable converters and satellite communications in
the late 70s made pay-cable services possible and created the
programming services component of the cable industry. However, since
the technology is already available to allow the growth of the
videotex information provider industry, once systems become available
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for the delivery of videotex information, this industry should begin
growing quite rapidly in comparison to the cable industry.
10.1 Barriers to Entry
As would be expected from an emerging industry, the entry
barriers to the videotex industry are generally quite small. However,
as firms begin entering this industry by 1985, entry barriers will
begin developing as economies of scale, brand identification and
experience curve effects become important.
10.1.1 Economies of Scale
Although eventually the videotex industry will experience
economies of scale, these economies are just beginning to be
recognized. The costs of bringing information suppliers in touch with
the right videotex users will decrease as the size of the videotex
system grows. This effect comes from the fact that the computers at
the heart of the videotex system become more efficient as they grow in
size. For instance, a videotex system for sixteen users might require
a $4000 investment per user; however, by simply adding more
multiplexers or controllers, 32 users may be supplied a videotex
system for an investment of only $2500 per user. We noted a very
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similar situation for cable system operators who can add additional
subscribers at a low variable cost compared to a high fixed cost of
the initial investment.
10.1.2 Brand Identification
Early entrants to the videotex industry expect to get their
greatest advantage from brand identification. In fact, presently four
of the five videotex system operators are rushing to be the first to
make major commercial introductions around the country. The other
potential system operator, the IBM, CBS, Sears Roebuck joint venture
can expect to benefit from the strong reputations of the partners;
therefore, they can afford to be slow in introducing their videotex
service.
10.1.3 Experience Curve Effects
Although experience curve effects will be important in the near
future, presently very few organizations have had enough experience
with videotex to build entry barriers. On the other hand, the ability
to gain experience in managing relations with each of the components
of the videotex industry may have stimulated the formation of joint
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ventures in this industry. Such joint ventures have experience that
might have taken decades to amass; thus, they are further along on
the experience curve than if they had been started by only one of the
partners. Furthermore, the first joint venture that appeared in the
videotex industry probably motivated others to form joint ventures
since they would otherwise be at a disadvantage with respect to their
position on the learning curve.
10.1.4 Capital Requirements
Unlike the cable industry, only a small investment is required to
become a videotex system operator. For instance, the hardware for a
system that can handle up to 24 simultaneous users can be obtained for
approximately $50,000. With the personnel required to manage such a
system, the annual cost of running this system costs only $150,000 a
year. Even large public systems can be established for less than $1
million. These figures are well within the limitations of small
startup companies. Thus, capital costs do not create entry barriers
to the videotex industry.
PAGE 151
10.2 Existing Rivalry
With only four companies offering full NAPLPS videotex services
by the end of 1984 in four different geographic areas in the U.S.,
rivalry does not yet seem important. Present participants are keeping
away from the competition by establishing operations in separate
cities. This may be the result of the newspaper publishing character
of these participants. Few major city newspapers have had to
vigorously compete with other papers in the same city. The newspaper
partner in each of the videotex joint ventures may be afraid to try a
competitive move against other operators because they lack the
competitive expertise.
This lack of competition may be beneficial to the videotex
industry since. it provides a consistent front to potential
advertisers, government regulators and financiers. Eventually,
however, four factors will contribute to an intense competition in the
videotex market.
0 Numerous competitors
0 Lack of switching costs
0 Capacity augmented in large increments
0 Diverse competitors
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10.2.1 Numerous Competitors
The low barriers to entry and the large numbers of interested
companies in the associated computer, communications, publishing and
service industries will create an industry with hundreds of
geographically competitive companies and a least two or three
competitors in one locality. The intensity of competition created by
the numbers will force differentiation and eventually several
companies will dominate the industry as multiple system operators or
information providers.
10.2.2 Low Switching Costs
Switching costs will always be low in the videotex industry
because a user only has to dial a different phone number - a process
that will soon mean the depression of only one button - to receive the
videotex services of another system operator. Two factors are
suggested to be important switching costs: the cost of switching
banks and the cost of subscribing to a service. However, both of
these will diminish as the competition in the industry grows. The
necessary acceptance of standards such as NAPLPS makes this low cost
switching possible.
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10.2.3 Capacity Augmented in Large Increments
Capacity additions will be disruptive as firms boost their
marketing efforts to fill unused, added capacity. However, the
marketability of computers, the major fixed asset directly involved in
videotex, allows these firms to avoid chronic overcapacity by selling
off unused machines.
10.2.4 Diverse Competitors
Since computer, publishing, communications and service industries
are considering major investment's in the videotex industry, the
diversity of players in this industry will probably be large. As a
result, no "rules of the game" will be agreed upon. Furthermore, the
sophistication of foreign firms such as British Telecom, French PTT
and Infomart make the strategic environment even more complex.
PAGE 154
10.3 Substitutes
Videotex must overcome the commonly used services that substitute
for videotex. A list of these substitutes is given in Table 10.1.
Most believe that once consumers see how cheaply and efficiently they
can get services through a videotex system, switching will occur
readily. A Booz, Allen and Hamilton study reported that the most
popular services were household budgeting, personal calendars, games,
travel reservations, electronic messages, education, banking, shopping
and monitoring of burglary and fire. These results suggest that
customers will not use videotex for services that offer little
advantage over presently used services such as newspapers.
10.4 Buyer Power
Buyers of videotex services will have strong bargaining powers.
Two characteristics of videotex give the buyers this power: the high
monthly cost relative to more familiar monthly communications
services, like phone and cable TV services, and the commodity-like
nature of videotex.-
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Table 10.1. SUBSTITUTES OF VIDEOTEX SERVICES.1 3 0
VIDEOTEX SERVICE SUBSTITUTES
Information Retrieval
Transactional
Messaging
Computing
Telemonitoring
Newspapers
Magazines
Television
Broadcast
Cable
Subscription TV
Audio cassettes
Records
VCR and videodisc
Radio
Telephone
Yellow pages
White pages
Paper files
Checks
Cr.edit cards
Purchase orders
Computerized billing
and payments
Catalog shopping
Telephone bill paying
Telephone shopping
Telephone
Mail and private carriers
Telegraph
Teleconferencing
Facsimile
Electronic mail
Specialized common carriers
Calculators
Video games
Electronic games
In-house data processing
Personal and home computers
Timesharing
Stand alone alarms
Autodial alarm systems
Security patrols
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10.5 Supplier Power
The suppliers of this industry include each of the companies now
considering entering the videotex industry as system operators:
computer, communications, publishing and service companies. This
means that the videotex industry has thousands of suppliers. However,
the communications, service and computer industries are dominated by a
few companies such as IBM, AT & T, and Sears. Thus, videotex
competitors may find these supplier forces affecting their strategy.
For instance, upon the announcement of the IBM, CBS, Sears joint
venture, many firms were concerned about whether they would be locked
out of the videotex markets. This concern probably caused increased
interest in defensive investments in videotex. Recent approval of the
NAPLPS standard has decreased the potential for supplier power.
10.6 The Future Structure of the Videotex Industry
The future structure of the videotex industry can best be
pictured with a comparison to the radio broadcasting industry. Like
the future videotex industry, the radio broadcasting industry is
characterized by low barriers to entry and low switching costs. Thus,
the radio dial has numerous channels, each with a quite differentiated
strategy to attract and hold listeners. Likewise, the videotex
industry will be made up of numerous companies which can be reached
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simply by pushing a different button on a phone or cable access
machine. Each videotex company will provide differentiating services
that attracts and holds a segment of the users of videotex services.
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11
JOINT VENTURES IN THE VIDEOTEX INDUSTRY
The large number of skills needed to be a successful entrant of
the videotex industry has forced the formation of many joint ventures.
Table 11.1 lists some of these joint ventures associated with the
videotex industry. Jay Borden, a communications consultant with The
Yankee Group, said that videotex is more easily done by an
organization with two or more of the following skills: communications
architecture design and operation, computer design and operation,
publishing or transaction processing.131 One other reason may explain
the motivations for forming joint ventures in the videotex industry:
videotex joint ventures are formed to obtain rapid national coverage.
We interviewed representatives from the main system operator
joint ventures -- Viewdata Corporation of America, Videotex America,
Keycom Electronic Publishing and IBM/CBS/Sears -- to determine each
partner's motivations and the joint venture structure. Since all but
one of these joint ventures is in an embryonic stage of development,
we discuss only the partners contributions and motivations, and the
structure of the joint ventures. Instead of an evaluation section, we
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Table 11.1. VIDEOTEX JOINT VENTURES.
PARENTS CONTRIBUTION
Infomart
Videotex America
GATEWAY
(Local Name)
GRASSROOTS
California
GRASSROOTS
America
Viewdata
Corporation
of America
VIEWTRON
(Local Name)
Keycom
Electronic
Publishing
Videotex
System
Operator
Videotex
System
Operator,
Videotex
Software,
GRASSROOTS,
TELEGUIDE.
GATEWAY,
GRASSROOTS,
National
Advertising
Agency,
Videotex
Consultants
Videotex
System
Operator
Videotex
System
Operator
Videotex
System
Operator
Videotex
System
Operator
Videotex
System
Operator
Videotex
System
Operator
IBM
CBS, Inc.
Sears & Roebuck Co.
Torstar Corp. (??%)
Southam Inc.(??%)
Infomart(50%)
Times Mirror(50%)
Videotex America(20%)
Local Affiliate(80%)
Videotex America(33%)
Bakersfield
Californian(3.3%) &
McClatchy Newspapers
(33%)
Videotex America(25%)
Agway Inc.(25%),
CENEX(25%), &
S. States Coop(25%)
Knight Ridder
AT & T
Viewdata CA (??%)
Local Newspaper Co.
Centel
Honeywell
News America
The System
Info & Entertainment
Transaction services
Software/Expertise
Image/Content exp.
Nat. ad. agency/Money
Local content and
advertising/Money
Nat. ad. agency/Money
Local content and
advertising/Money/
Nat. farm ad. agency
Nat. ad. agency/Money
Local content and
advertising/Money/
Nat. farm ad. agency
Content/Money
Technology
Nat. Content/Videotex
Experience/Money
Local Content and
advertising/Money
Administration/Money
Computer Technology
Content
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CHILD NAME PRODUCT
Table 11.1. VIDEOTEX JOINT VENTURES (continued).
CHILD NAME
Warner Amex
Cable
Communications
??9
PRODUCT
Videotex
System
Operator
(QUBE)
Downloading
Electronic
Games and
Two-way
Game Service
Full motion
Videotex
System
Operator
PARENTS
Warner Communications
Inc.(50%)
Shearson Lehman
American Express(50%)
Warner Communications
Inc.
Activision
Warner Communications
& Four other partners
The System/Money
Marketing expertise/
Money
Hardware expertise
Software expertise
Only made it to
negotiation stage
will use the conclusions from our cable industry study to make
recommendations to each of these joint ventures in the next chapter.
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CONTRIBUTION
AT & T and VIEWDATA CORPORATION OF AMERICA
Although VCA is not a true joint venture between two partners
that share an equity share in VCA, it involves a cooperative marketing
agreement between Knight Ridder Newspaper Co. and AT & T which may
result in a joint venture in the future.132 The initial test was
carried out by Knight Ridder and AT & T in 1980 in Coral Gables,
Florida. This test determined the reactions of 700 households in
phase I and 5000 households in phase II. Following the test, a full
scale market test was rolled out on November 1, 1983. 133
CONTRIBUTIONS--AT & T has been providing the terminals, communication
expertise and customer service center, while Knight Ridder has been
providing all the capital for VCA, the videotex software and the
content for the VIEWTRON service. Both companies are making a
concerted effort to market the terminals and the service in a
package.134
MOTIVATIONS--Knight Ridder made the joint marketing agreement with AT
& T because they "don't want to be in the terminal sales business,"
said Jay Borden. 135 AT & T uses this cooperative marketing agreement
as a way to test the market for its videotex terminals. 13 6
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STRUCTURE--As mentioned above, the relationship between AT & T and
Knight Ridder does not involve the creation of a company in which both
companies have equity. Instead, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Knight
Ridder, Viewdata Corporation of America, has made a contractual
arrangement with AT & T. This agreement describes the phases of the
market testing to be completed in south Florida, the interests and
roles of each partner in joint advertising, promoting and selling the
videotex service and terminal package, and leaves open the future
direction of the relationship after this initial testing phase. Thus,
an equity relationship might be the outcome of this relationship.
Knight Ridder could market any other terminals independent of AT &
T. 137
COMMENTS--The head of AT & T's relationship with Knight Ridder, Sam
Berkman said, "The greatest impediment to a successful joint venture
is the changing of the individuals in each partner who are responsible
for implementation of the joint venture. Each time an individual
changes, issues must be rehashed that were once settled." Through
major personnel changes throughout AT & T caused by the divestiture,
and other personnel changes occurring at Knight Ridder, Sam Berkman
and his contemporary with Knight Ridder kept the relationship
going. 138
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VIEWDATA CORPORATION OF AMERICA AND LOCAL PAPERS
VCA intends to form true joint ventures with local newspaper
publishers such as Affiliated Publications, the publisher of the
Boston Globe, to develop a national videotex service offering.139
CONTRIBUTIONS--In the local joint ventures, VCA will provide the
videotex software, system operating expertise and the national
information database while the local company will provide the local
information and capital. 140
MOTIVATIONS--They decided to go into joint ventures in the the local
markets because they lack all the local information and they want
someone who knows the local market and who has the local advertising
experience. 141
STRUCTURE--The local joint venture structure will involve the
formation of a joint venture child in which both VCA and the local
newspaper concern will have equity. Although the percentage split is
uncertain at this time, the local partner will have control of the
joint venture. 142
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AT & T and CBS, INC.
After beginning the market test with Knight Ridder and being
forced to stop an effort to develop an electronic yellow page
directory with Southwestern Bell, AT & T developed a joint
relationship with CBS, Inc. This strategic alliance has already been
disbanded after the initial market test in Ridgewood, N.J.143
CONTRIBUTIONS--In this arrangement, CBS provided only the content for
the videotex services. AT & T provided everything else including
hardware, software, and marketing. 44
MOTIVATIONS--AT & T used this joint relationship to develop the
markets for videotex terminals. Furthermore, AT & T thought this
would be a way to use the hardware and the software that they could no
longer use in the development of an electronic yellow page directory
with Southwestern Bell. 14 5 CBS probably thought this would be a way
for them to learn about videotex and to make an investment in a
videotex system operator.
STRUCTURE--Like AT & T's relationship with Knight Ridder, its
relationship with CBS was purely a contractual arrangement. The
agreement layed out the roles of each partner in performing the field
test in N.J. and the future was left open. When time came to make a
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commitment to further and market introduction, the relationship was
terminated. 146
COMMENTS--The breakup of this strategic alliance probably stemmed from
the differences in cultures between AT & T and CBS, Inc. As an
entertainment company, CBS tends to do business in an aggressive
manner while AT & T is more methodical. This assumption has been
confirmed by press reports that CBS thought AT & T did not know
anything about marketing.147 An aggressive company like CBS would be
expected to release such rumors after a relationship with the passive
marketing style of AT & T.
Another problem experienced by this joint venture was that their goals
were not congruent. AT & T simply wanted to stimulate the market for
its videotex business by helping CBS become a videotex system
operator. At this they were quite successful, CBS is in the videotex
system operator business and they might not have been in that business
if they had not had the chance to learn about the industry from AT &
T.148 However, CBS probably intended to use this joint venture as a
way to build an investment in a videotex system operator. These
incongruent motivations for entering a strategic alliance probably
insured the failure of the relationship.
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VIDEOTEX AMERICA CORPORATION
Videotex America is a joint venture between Times Mirror Co, a
multimedia company located in southern California, and Infomart,
itself a joint venture of two publishing companies in Canada. The
joint venture was formed in 1982 after Times Mirror had purchased
videotex software and services from Infomart for its initial videotex
trials. 149
CONTRIBUTIONS--Infomart brought its expertise in NAPLPS videotex
software development and in videotex system operation. Times Mirror
brought to the table its presence in the U.S., an initial investment
in testing the GATEWAY system in the Los Angeles area, and marketing
skills. 150,151
MOTIVATIONS--Both Infomart and Times Mirror will use Videotex America
as a means of investing in videotex system operators in the U.S.
Infomart apparently sees the joint venture as a means of obtaining
sales of its software. Infomart also formed the joint venture with
Times Mirror to build a reputation in the U.S. that a name like Times
Mirror brought to the joint venture. Like other citizens of other
nations, Americans prefer to buy products and services from a national
company such as Times Mirror rather than a foreign company like
Infomart. Times Mirror has gained a partner who has developed the
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most profitable videotex system today - Teleguide, a public videotex
system. This relationship has increased Times Mirror's chances of
being successful in the videotex markets and, therefore, increased
their expected returns from videotex investments.
15 2
,
15 3
STRUCTURE--Videotex America is a 50/50 partnership. The company is
headed by James Holly, President and CEO who reports to a Board of
Directors made up of ten people, five from Times Mirror and five from
Infomart. Penny Jo Welsch of Videotex America, said that under the
terms of the partnership agreement, "certain decisions are decided by
a toss of a coin when there is a tie vote." 15 4 Under the president is
the Vice President of Technology who manages Videotex America's
interests with hardware suppliers and standards decisions; Vice
President of Marketing who markets videotex to national advertisers;
Vice President of Business Development who manages the affiliate
program and oversees the involvement with Grassroots. 155
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VIDEOTEX AMERICA AND LOCAL SYSTEM OPERATOR
Like VCA, Videotex America has developed affiliates. who will
become joint venture partners when they decide to establish GATEWAY
videotex system operators in their localities. For example, the
Washington Post Company will form a joint venture with Videotex
America when it decides to begin operating a videotex system in the
Washington, D.C. area. Similarly, Videotex America is also forming
joint ventures with farm cooperatives in the U.S. to establish
GRASSROOTS videotex system operators which will market videotex
services to farmers across the country. Grassroots California is a
joint venture of Videotex America, Information Sources, Inc., a
subsidiary of McClatchy Newspapers, and Viewcom, Inc., a subsidiary of
The Bakersfield Californian. Grassroots America is a joint venture of
Videotex America and three farm cooperatives in the northeast farming
area: Agway, Inc., CENEX, and Southern States Cooperative,
Inc. 156,157
CONTRIBUTIONS--Both the GATEWAY local partner and Videotex America
will contribute a portion of the capital in proportion to the equity
that they receive. However, the local system operator must license
the software from Infomart and purchase the national database,
consulting, management and national advertising agency services from
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Videotex America. The local affiliate partner will provide all local
information content, consumer visibility and credibility, and
established advertising contacts.158
Videotex America will make similar contributions to the joint
ventures developing the GRASSROOTS service. The farm cooperatives
will market the service to their farmer members as well as represent
GRASSROOTS to the national companies interested in advertising to
farmers.159
MOTIVATIONS--The local GATEWAY affiliates look at the joint venture as
a way to gain the experience of a company that has already established
videotex systems in the U.S. Videotex America looks at these local
joint ventures as a way to gain an investment in system operators
across the country and to sell their software and services.
16 0
,
16 1
The cooperatives investing in GRASSROOTS look at their investment
as a way to offer an additional service to their members. This
service is important to members because it offers unique,
constantly-updated information that is essential to staying
competitive in the agricultural markets.
STRUCTURE--The GATEWAY affiliates will closely observe the Times
Mirror Videotex Service commercial introduction of the second
consumer-oriented NAPLPS service. When they decide to enter the
market, they will invest 80% of the capital and Videotex America will
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invest 20%. The equity will be divided similarly. However, if some
independent approaches Videotex America about establishing a videotex
system operator in one of the cities of an affiliate, the affiliate
will have first refusal rights. 162 If the affiliate decides not to
invest at that point, Videotex America will be free to form a system
operator with the independent. 163
The GRASSROOTS joint ventures have been divided equally among the
partners, but in both cases the farm cooperatives control the major
share of the joint venture. Grassroots California is divided into
three 33% parts and Grassroots America is divided into four 25%
parts. 164
Both GATEWAY and GRASSROOTS systems are managed by a group that
runs the programs computers, builds the database and sells advertising
to local advertisers. The Board of Directors of these system
operators will reflect the equity percentages of each partner.165
KEYCOM ELECTRONIC PUBLISHING]
Keycom was originally established when Centel, a phone and cable
company in the midwest, initiated a task force composed of
representation from several companies for the purpose of deciding
whether videotex provided a lucrative business opportunity. After an
affirmative decision, Centel joined forces with Honeywell, another
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task force member, to begin a business in videotex. After deciding
that they would also need a partner with experience in publishing,
they sought Field Communcations, because their subsidiary, Field
Electronic Publishing, had been developing a teletext service (a
one-way relative to NAPLPS videotex). Centel and Honeywell bought
into this subsidiary and then the name was changed to Keycom
Electronic Publishing. More recently, News America Publishing, a
Rupert Murdoch umbrella organization that owns the Chicago Sun-Times,
purchased the remaining share of Field Communications.166
CONTRIBUTIONS--Centel provides the communications and administration
experience. According to this plan, they have filled the primary
staff positions, for instance. Honeywell has provided the computer
hardware and software support, but Keycom claims that they developed
the decoder terminal through a contract with Honeywell. The venture
uses Honeywell computers and Honeywell will manufacture the decoder
terminal. News America Publishing will provide the content for many
of Keycom's services.167
MOTIVATIONS--Vernon Cain, the VP of Operations for Keycom and a
previous employee of Centel who was involved in the establishment of
Keycom, said that Centel decided to use the joint venture strategy for
two reasons. First, Centel felt that they did not have all the needed
resources themselves to start up a videotex business. Second, the
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joint venture strategy insured that "all three [companies] would be
trying to make sure their investment does not fly away," said Cain. 168
Centel thought that a joint venture arrangement creates more
commitment to success than a contractual arrangement. Honeywell
clearly thought the joint venture would be a good way to try to
maintain a position in the computer market. Field Communcations
originally entered the Teletext business by publishing an electronic
magazine which is now transmitted to 30 million cable subscribers in
the vertical blanking interval of superstation WTBS. Replacing Field
Communications, News America considers Keycom a defensive strategy to
protect their interests in publishing. 169
STRUCTURE--The percentage each company owns changes with each
additional investment, but now it stands at 54% for Centel, 30% for
Honeywell and 16% for News America Publishing. The joint venture has
a Board of Partners that "meet more often than called for in the
Bylaws," said Jeffrey Ballowe, a public relations person with Keycom.
The Board is chaired by an executive from Centel and has
representation from each company. Many of the staff came from either
Centel or Field Electronic Publishing, but the majority have come from
outside the parents. The investment up to March 1984 was
approximately $25 million. 170
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IBM - CBS, Inc - Sears and Roebuck Co.
With the breakup of the CBS/AT & T cooperative arrangement to
test videotex in Ridgewood, N.J., CBS, Inc. went looking for some
partners and found them. On 14 February, all participants in the
videotex industry were temporarily stunned to hear that three super
powers in computers, publishing and services had joined forces to
begin joint venture discussions. Although it would be two years
before this joint venture would offer any services, its presence as a
participant in the industry has changed the industry.' 71
CONTRIBUTIONS--Sears and Roebuck Co will bring the experience it has
gained as an information provider in several videotex experiments, as
well as its experience gained through majority ownership of The Hudson
Bay Co., which has a successful electronic catalog on GRASSROOTS.
Presumably, IBM will be responsible for supplying the videotex
hardware and software expertise gained from their experience
establishing the West German national videotex system. CBS will
probably be responsible for providing the commercially-sponsored
content of the various entertainment and information retrieval
services. CBS has had experience providing similar services in the
videotex test it performed in cooperation with AT & T. 172
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MOTIVATIONS--These have not been made clear in any of the press
releases about the joint venture, although it seems clear that each
partner sees synergies between videotex and their businesses. IBM is
participating to increase its share of the hardware market for
videotex systems of which Digital Equipment Corporation currently has
more than 50%.' 73
STRUCTURE--The only structure decided thus far is that the equity will
be split 33/33/33 and that the company will be staffed by employees
from each company. Theodore C. Papes, Jr., an IBM vice president was
named president and chief executive officer of the joint venture.
Also a committee with nine members, three from each partner, has been
formed to oversee operations of the new venture. Representing CBS
will be the chairman and CEO, Thomas Wyman; President of
CBS/Publishing group, Peter A. Derow; and senior vice president and
general counsel, James K. Parker. Representing IBM are John F.
Akers, president; Dean P. Phypers, senior vice president; and
Richard T. Liebhaber, IBM director of business development and
practices. Sears will be represented by their senior vice president
of corporate administration, Charles F. Moran; vice president of
corporate planning, Dean P. Phypers; and executive vice president
and treasurer of Allstate Insurance Corp., Wayne E. Hedien. 174
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CONCLUSION
With this overview of the videotex system operator joint
ventures, we now make recommendations to these and future videotex
joint ventures that might improve their chances of success. This
analysis will apply the knowledge we gained from studying joint
ventures in the cable industry and will be broken down into three
parts: justifications for comparing joint ventures in the cable and
videotex industries; recommendations for operating videotex joint
ventures; and a description of the characteristics of the perfect
joint venture.
12.1 Justifications for Cable and Videotex Industry Comparison
The best way to explain the appropriateness of a comparison of
the joint ventures in the cable and videotex industry is to show that
the similarities between these two industries outweigh the
differences.
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12.1.1 Differences
In making these comparisons between the cable and videotex
industries, one should be aware of three important differences between
these two industries:
o Different causes for high competition.
O Different skills required by each industry.
O Different competitive elements effect each industry.
Clearly, the major reason for the formations of joint ventures in the
cable industry has been to combat the high competition in the
industry; whereas, the major reason for the formation of joint
ventures in the videotex industry is to acquire numerous skills
necessary to run a videotex system operator. These differences also
dictate how each industry will evolve in the future.
Different causes for high competition - Although both industries
experience high competition, different mechanisms cause the
competition, and, therefore, it occurs in different phases of the life
cycle for each industry. Cable industry participants compete for the
distribution channels. These channels are controlled by the
franchising authorities and satellite companies. Once the rights to
the satellite transponders and franchises have been determined,
PAGE 177
competition among industry participants focuses on the forces that
determine choice among the cable substitutes like traditional
broadcast television and among the different cable programming
services that already have access to the cable distribution channels.
This competitive drive for distribution channels has motivated the
formation of joint ventures in the cable industry.
Because videotex companies can choose among one or a combination
of broadcast, switched and unswitched phone, satellite or cable
communication channels, and because the non-cable communication
channels are regulated as common carriers, videotex companies can
survive without competing for distribution channels. Videotex
companies will compete, not in the early stages of industry
development when videotex companies will segregate themselves
geographically by choice to minimize-competition, but rather in later
stages when numerous companies will compete in one geographic area.
Where competition in the cable industry has shrunk as the industry
matures and develops its local monopolies, competition in the videotex
industry will grow as it matures and videotex firms will differentiate
to fight the competition. Eventually, the competition in the videotex
industry will also taper off as differentiation and high entry
barriers cause the formation of an oligopoly. Because the character
of the high degree of competition will be differentiation, joint
ventures will not form as a result of the high competition in the
videotex industry.
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Different skills required by each industry - Both industries require
different types of skills. The cable industry required professionals
skilled in bidding for franchises, in cable construction and
operation, and in video programming. The videotex industry will
initially require expertise in communications, computers, advertising
sales, transaction processing, and information providing. Since
videotex is a broader approach to providing state-of-the-art cable
services, it is forced to find broader expertise in these skills than
required by the cable industry. These needs of videotex system
operators probably have driven the search for joint venture partners
in the videotex industry.
Different competitive elements effect each industry - Unlike firms in
the videotex industry, firms in the cable industry must compete with
the common carrier communications industries such as the satellite
communications, broadcast and phone communications industries. As
this competition between these communications industries intensifies,
either cable companies will be forced to sell their cable and other
plant facilities to a communications company and concentrate on
competing in the videotex system operator business; or, more likely,
they will relinquish their control of information content to videotex
system operators and concentrate on competing as a common carrier in
the communications business. Presently, cable companies are the only
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owners of a communications conduit that are not legally separated from
the information providing industry. However, as phone companies lay
fiber optic cable with ultra-wide bandwidth and direct broadcast
satellite companies begin offering more services at the same cost, the
legal difference between cable and other communications channels will
become unimportant as cable companies open their channels to more and
more services to remain competitive.
Meanwhile, other cable companies may choose to sell off their
communications assets to become videotex system operators. This seems
less likely since the majority of the assets of a cable company are in
the communications plant and not in information providing. They have
more or less maintained a role as an information distributor and they
will probably choose to continue to be an information distributor with
less control over the content that they distribute. Returning to the
comparison of the cable industry to the videotex industry, the cable
industry distributes information mainly to support a distribution
channel, whereas the videotex industry's only role is the distribution
of information.
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12.1.2 Similarities
However, we think that these industries can be compared because
both types of companies are in the business of distributing
information. The cable companies must concern themselves with
reception of information from programmers just as videotex companies
must consider how they can retrieve information from the information
providers. Both types of companies must find the lowest cost
technologies for distributing information to their customers.
Furthermore, videotex and cable companies are concerned with the
content of information provided to their customers.
These similarities were examined closely in the discussion of the
structure of the videotex industry. Both industries have information
providers (called programming service providers in the cable
industry), communications network providers (specifically satellite
and coaxial cable in the cable industry) and system operators.
Videotex system operators provide two-way services from various
information providers via numerous types of technologies; whereas,
cable system operators provide one and two-way services from mainly
video programming services via satellite and coaxial cable
technologies. Both types of companies provide information to the
consumer in an interactive, two-way environment. This industrial
economic perspective shows that the videotex industry actually
include.s the cable industry. These similarities result in a
PAGE 181
competitive relationship between the cable and videotex industries.
Other factors make these two industries behave similarly.
Although both industries have high barriers to entry, only high
economies of scale is common to both. Nonetheless, this similarity is
important because it causes high industry concentration and stimulates
joint venture formation.
Both industries have a local nature and focus, i.e. they both
have local system operators with a national multiple system operators
that own percentages of the local operators. This similar industry
structure has evolved because both industries are concerned with the
distribution of information and a decentralized structure, such as the
multiple system operator structure seems the most efficient means of
distributing information.
Also, both industries seem to be in different phases of high
growth. The cable industry may be at the end of its high growth
phase; whereas, the videotex industry is at an early stage of its
high growth phase. This life cycle comparison, as well as the
information distribution character, high entry barriers, and the local
nature of both industries, make a comparison of cable and videotex
joint ventures possible. What was learned in the early and high
growth phase of the cable industry, should be applicable to the
similar, but younger videotex industry.
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12.2 Recommendations for operating videotex joint ventures.
With this knowledge of the similarities and differences between
the cable industries, we will take each of the videotex joint ventures
described in the previous chapter and make recommendations based on
how well they meet the four criteria we found for successful joint
ventures in the cable industry:
o Similar corporate cultures or an awareness of their
dissimilarities.
o Complementary skills.
O Similar goals.
o An agreement on where the ultimate control lies.
12.2.1 AT & T and Viewdata Corporation of America
We recommend that this cooperative relationship remain as such
and not develop as a joint venture, unless AT & T decides to
relinquish its desire to be a major supplier of videotex system
hardware and software for an opportunity to invest in a major multiple
videotex system operator. Only with this change in corporate goals
would both partners have an agreement on the joint ventures goals. We
can not accurately assess their present relationship since we studied
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joint ventures in this thesis, not cooperative agreements. This
strategic alliance, mistakingly called a joint venture and frequently
formed between communications network providers and system operators
or between information providers and system operators (called "gateway
joint ventures"), would be an excellent topic for future research.
12.2.2 Viewdata Corporation of America and a Local Newspaper Company
Given an appropriate business climate, we suspect these local
system operator joint ventures will be a successful approach to
introducing videotex services to national markets. Both partners have
similar corporate cultures because they are both newspaper companies.
Also, the partners bring complementary skills to the joint venture -
the local company brings local advertising and content and the
national company brings videotex system operating experience and
national content. The goals will match since both partners have an
interest in building a successful videotex system operator.
Furthermore, each joint venture gives the local partner control. All
the components are present for a successful joint venture.
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12.2.3 Videotex America
We recommend that the two partners of Videotex America be aware
of two potential problems. First, the conservative culture of Times
Mirror does not fit with the aggressive Infomart which aspires to
become the leading videotex system developer and operator. Second,
neither Times Mirror nor Infomart seem to have management control of
the joint venture.
Times Mirror may already have taken the proper precautions
concerning the differences in corporate cultures by allowing Infomart
to separately market the TELEGUIDE public videotex system. Times
Mirror put Infomart in touch with The Chronicle Publishing Company
which now offers the first public-access videotex system in the U.S.,
Bay Area TELEGUIDE. Times Mirror got only a finders fee for making
that connection. This strategy also complements the Videotex America
strategy, because the public videotex system will familiarize the San
Francisco consumer to videotex. As Penny Welsch said, "It's real hard
to explain to people what videotex is real hard. That's the biggest
hurdle is to explain what it is. Then you can sell it." TELEGUIDE
serves this educational purpose; then Videotex America comes in to
sign a joint venture with The Chronicle Publishing Company to market
the home videotex system. Once again, management ingenuity may have
solved the conflict between a conservative Times Mirror and an
aggressive Infomart as well as improved the chances of success for the
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joint venture.
Concerning the control issue, the Board of Directors is split
50/50, but Times Mirror has put James Holly, President of Times Mirror
Videotex Services, at the helm of Videotex America. Still, potential
control problems might arise as the partner organizations change and
issues have to be rehashed in costly Board meetings.
However, we think that this joint venture may actually succeed
because both partners clearly have complementary skills and planning
is an important part of the venture. Concerning complementary skills,
Infomart, a successful videotex company which has established the
profitable or nearly profitable GRASSROOTS and TELEGUIDE services in
Canada, as well as the excellent reputation of Times Mirror, gives
this joint venture credibility. Penny Welsch of Videotex America said
that things have probably gone smoothly because "Times Mirror is a
planning-oriented organization. Everything is written out and agreed
upon before they implement it." 17 5
12.2.4 Videotex America and Local System Operators
Given that the Videotex America joint venture succeeds, these
local system operator joint ventures will probably also be successful.
However, the partners in the GRASSROOTS system operator joint ventures
should take precautions to avoid problems that might arise from
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differences in corporate cultures between the newspaper cultures of
Videotex America and the farm cooperative cultures. Different
corporate cultures is not a problem in the GATEWAY system operator
joint ventures because, both partners have newspaper corporate
cultures.
Clearly, the partners bring complementary skills to the joint
venture. In the GATEWAY system operator joint ventures the local
company brings local advertising and content and the national company
brings videotex system operating experience and national content; and
in the GRASSROOTS system operator joint ventures, the farm
cooperatives bring a unique distribution channel for marketing
videotex services and numerous contacts with national farm
advertisers. The goals will match since partners in both the GATEWAY
and GRASSROOTS joint ventures have an interest in building a
successful videotex system operator. Although each GATEWAY system
operator joint venture gives the local partner control, the GRASSROOTS
system operator joint ventures give the farm cooperatives control, but
no single partner has control. All the components are present for a
successful joint venture.
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12.2.5 Keycom Electronic Publishing
Since Centel controls this joint venture with 54% of the equity
and most of the executive level management positions, the major
cultural differences among the partners probably will have little
effect on the success of this joint venture. However, Centel better
insure itself that an investment in a videotex system operator fits
with Honeywell's long term strategies. If the motivation of Honeywell
was solely to develop markets for its knowledge of computer hardware
and software, then Centel may find that this partner is less committed
to building a videotex system operator when changes occur in the
management of Honeywell or when Keycom requires a major investment to
introduce its service to the national markets.
12.2.6 IBM, CBS, Inc., and Sears and Roebuck Co.
This joint venture should be careful to insure that problems
arising from large diversity in culture are considered before an
agreement is completed. Each company should consider whether their
actual goals match the goals of the other partners. Finally, the
joint venture should more precisely outline which partner will have
control of the joint venture.
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We make these recommendations because the differences in
corporate cultures between these three companies must be great. IBM
is a giant, a slow mover and lacks experience in consumer marketing.
CBS, Inc. is -in the highly competitive entertainment business
characterized by aggressive and cut-throat behavior. 17 6 Sears and
Roebuck Co. is in the retail sales business. Without careful
planning and a clear awareness of the potential problems these
differences might cause, this joint venture will have only a short
life.
Also, we wonder about whether the actual goals of these companies
are congruent. Is IBM really interested in an investment in a
videotex system operator, or is it trying to develop its markets for
videotex system software and hardware as well as for the IBM Personal
Computer and its offspring? If IBM wants the latter, then we suspect
that as soon as the joint venture establishes a market position for
IBM videotex system hardware and software, IBM will divest. Although
this may mean a successful joint venture to IBM, the other two
partners might fail to obtain their goal of investing in a videotex
system operator.
Control also seems an important issue since according to the
information that the companies have released, no one company has
control of the joint venture. 177,178 If the joint venture remains with
this structure, nothing will get done as the structures within the
partners and the companies fail to maintain agreement about management
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issues.
12.3 Summary
Using the four factors of successful joint ventures that we
outlined from our studies of the cable industry, we have identified
potential problems in each of the national system operator joint
ventures. We also conclude that the relationships with a local
newspaper company should succeed at giving Viewdata Corporation of
America and Videotex America a major investment in videotex system
operators around the country. However, this prediction relies on the
assumption that videotex system operation will be a viable business in
the future.
More generally, we have found that of each of the four factors of
success -- one partner controls the joint venture, each partner
contributes complementary skills, the partners have congruent goals,
and the partners have similar cultures -- control stands out as the
most important. Without insuring that one partner has control of the
joint venture, partners will spend large amounts of time reworking
decisions that have been made in previous meetings. As the
partnership ages the frequency of this problem increases as the
personnel and corporate strategies associated with each partner
change. Definite control by one partner insures that once decisions
are made, they must only be reworked if the partner in control decides
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to make a strategic change.
Clearly, these problems should be considered in any attempt to
form a joint venture. Many of the partners involved in videotex joint
ventures have apparently considered their impact on the joint venture
and, therefore, have increased their likelihood of success.
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